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The World Economy
Overview
The world economy continues to expand robustly in the fall of 2005 despite
the increase in the price of oil. Having slowed over the course of last year,
output growth has actually accelerated again. The negative effects exerted
by the higher prices for crude oil and other commodities have been counter-
acted by an ongoing expansionary monetary policy stance, by low interest
rates on the capital markets, by a substantial appreciation in the value of
assets, and by a very favorable profit situation for enterprises. As a result,
real Gross Domestic Product continued to expand rapidly in the first half of
the year in the growth centers China and the USA, while, following a period
of stagnation, it also increased significantly in Japan. The expansion of mac-
roeconomic output persisted in many industrializing countries, whereas
growth remained moderate in the euro zone and in Great Britain.
These different growth rates to a large extent reflect differences in the
rate of expansion of productive capacity, which is much higher in the USA
than in Japan or the euro zone. But the differences between the regions'
cyclical trends have also persisted. While macroeconomic capacity utiliza-
tion increased perceptibly in the USA and in Japan, it diminished again in
the euro zone. At the same time, the imbalances in the global economy were
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further reinforced. Thus, the USA's current account defi-
cit rose to a hefty 6% of GDP. By contrast, China saw a
sizeable increase in its current account surplus despite
high import spending on oil and other commodities. In
particular, however, the current account surpluses of the
oil-exporting countries expanded significantly.
Inflation strengthened over the course of the year, in
most cases noticeably so. However, the increase was pri-
marily a direct consequence of the rise in energy prices.
There were no conspicuous second-round effects as
wage growth accelerated at most marginally. Measured
in terms of the core inflation rate, price growth basically
remained moderate, and there was also little increase in
inflationary expectations.
World economy defies sharp rise in oil prices
The price of crude oil has more or less doubled over the
course of the last two years (cf. figure 1). Around
US $ 60 are currently paid for a barrel of North Sea
Brent, and the Institutes have based their forecast on the
assumption that this price will persist (cf. box 1). The
most recent price rise has thus reached the kind of
dimensions seen in 1973 to 1974, 1978 to 1980, 1989 to
1990, and 1999 to 2000. Each of these oil-price shocks
was accompanied by a pronounced slowdown in world
economic activity.
However, it is not certain to what extent the increase
in the price of oil was actually a decisive factor behind
the recession in each of these cases. In both 1973 and
1990, for example, the economic turning point in the
USA occurred not prior but subsequent to the relative
oil-price shock.1
When the burden on the national economies of the
industrialized countries is measured in terms of the loss
in purchasing power determined by the oil-price rises _
which can be approximated as the change in the 'oil bill'
_ the effects due to the episodes in 1990 and 1999 to 2000
prove to be comparatively slight (cf. table 2). By con-
trast, the additional expenditure required between 2003
and 2005, which totals over 1.5% of GDP, is substantial,
even if the burden is smaller in most cases than during
the oil-price rises of the 1970s, because the oil intensity
of production has decreased substantially (cf. figure 3).2
Simulations based on macroeconometric world mod-
els also indicate that the dampening effects of the kind
of sharp oil price rises seen recently are substantial.
According to these simulations, an increase of US $ 30
Source: HWWA (Hamburg Institute of International Economics).
Figure 1
HWWA Index for Crude Oil and Industrial Commodities, 1995 to 2005
2000 = 100
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1  Cf. R. Barsky and L. Kilian: 'Oil and the Macroeconomy since the
1970s.' In: Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 18, no. 4, 2004,
pp. 115-134.
2  With the exception of the USA, where the share of oil consumption
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in the price of oil will curtail output growth in the indus-
trialized countries by around one percentage point
within two years.3
Nonetheless, since spring 2005, when oil prices were
expected to be much lower,4 there has been practically
no downward revision of economic forecasts (not only
the Institutes' forecast) for the rise in real GDP. The rea-
sons are multiple:
–   The current rise in oil prices is mainly demand
driven, whereas the previous oil-price shocks were
largely caused by supply shortages.5 Accordingly,
prices did not rise quite as rapidly this time as in
past shocks, so that the burden of adjustment was
spread out over a longer period of time. Alongside
ongoing robust growth in the USA, another factor
that contributed to the strong rise in demand for oil
3  For further details, see the Excursus on p. 383 ff.
4  The Institutes based their spring forecast on an assumed average oil
price of US $ 50 this year and of US $ 48 next year.
The oil-price trend
World market prices for crude oil rose again over the course of
the year, despite the fact that – according to the International
Energy Agency (IEA) – at 1.6% in the first half of this year,
consumption expanded at only half the rate seen a year ago
(3.3%).1 The only way to meet the additional demand for
crude oil was to further reduce the existing reserve production
capacities, which are already extremely low by historical stan-
dards (cf. figure 2). In this kind of situation, production disrup-
tions can rapidly lead to sharp price increases. Thus, the price
of oil skyrocketed recently following the outages of oil produc-
tion facilities and refineries in the Gulf of Mexico. But it quickly
dropped again as the shortages were met with the help of
emergency reserves and the damage proved to be less
severe than initially feared.
This year's price rise is surprising in the sense that output has
exceeded consumption for over two years now. This circum-
stance has led to the conclusion in several areas of public
opinion that oil is currently over-priced and that the price is
bound to fall significantly in the future. But today's price for a
storable commodity such as crude oil also depends to a sub-
stantial extent on the shortages expected in the future. If mar-
ket participants were expecting the oil price to drop, then
stocks would be reduced and the price would already be
under pressure today. Stocks have actually been extremely
low on occasion, but they have recently been substantially
increased. Clearly, then, an easing of the situation on the oil
market is not expected in the near future.
In addition, in view of the meager reserve capacities, the ratio-
nal approach from the producers' point of view is to safeguard
themselves against future price fluctuations by stocking up
beyond the levels that have been customary in the past. The
Institutes therefore do not expect to see the kind of turnaround
in stock dispositions that could lead any time soon to a sharp
drop in the price of oil. This assessment is corroborated by the
prices prevailing on the futures markets.
8 It is often claimed that the activities of financial traders, in
other words the buying and selling of oil contracts without any
actual interest in the commodity itself, are responsible for the
high oil prices on the futures markets. In addition, it is argued,
this type of speculation exacerbates the volatility of the oil
price. There is little to support either claim, however. While it is
true that futures and options trading in commodities has
increased in recent years, these activities have increased
liquidity on the market and have improved the opportunities for
enterprises in the oil sector to protect themselves against
price risks by selling oil futures. Transactions of this kind usu-
ally lead to a reduction in the respective asset risks of both
parties, but not to markedly higher prices. At best it can be
surmised that – similar to the case of other assets such as
property – the substantial amount of liquidity available on the
world financial markets has also pushed up prices on the
commodities markets. 1  'IEA Oil Market Report'. Paris, September 2005.
Figure 2
World Oil Production: Reserve Capacities
Million barrels/day
Sources: U.S. Department of Energy; Energy Information Administration, Septem-
ber 2005; Institutes' calculations; 2005 and 2006: Institutes' forecast.













5  For example, the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 to 1974 and production
restrictions in the course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the
Iran-Iraq War in 1980, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.374 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005
was the pace of growth in China and other industri-
alizing countries. At the same time, exports from the
other countries to the growth centers were boosted,
so that the former were able to cope comparatively
well with the increase in the price of oil.
–   The oil-exporting countries use their additional
income on the one hand for imports, which bolsters
demand in the oil-importing countries, and on the
other for investments on the global capital market,
which on trend reduces long-term interest rates.
The idea that oil prices have been rendered more volatile by
the activities of financial traders is not supported by empirical
findings, such as those relating to the US futures market in
2003 and 2004.1 Moreover, at least in the days immediately
following Hurricane Katrina that saw the steepest price rises
for gasoline, financial traders in the USA were actually selling
gasoline on the futures markets, on balance, and were there-
fore responsible for leveling out prices to some extent.2 The
asset markets can experience isolated long-term cases of
excessive price rises that are difficult to blame on market par-
ticipants' estimations of real shortages or risks. However, it is
not easy to find concrete evidence of bubbles of this kind
recently forming on the crude oil markets.
The fundamental situation on the oil markets is likely to
remain strained over the forecast period (cf. table 1). World oil
consumption will probably rise at much the same pace as to
date, with the increase once again concentrated in the Asian
countries, and especially in China. While an increase in pro-
duction capacities can be expected on the supply side, the
low level of investment for many years in the development of
new production facilities suggests that the expansion will not
suffice to engender a significant increase in reserve capaci-
ties. This view is based on the assumption that oil production
in Iraq, which on the latest figures still only amounts to two-
thirds of the pre-war volume of 3 million barrels per day, will
not increase to any significant degree for the foreseeable
future. Given that the risks for significant price fluctuations
both upwards and downwards have more or less the same
weight, it seems reasonable to base this forecast on the cur-
rent oil price of around US $ 60.
1  Cf. Michael Haigh, Jana Hranaiova, and James A. Overdahl: 'Price
Dynamics, Price Discovery and Large Trader Interactions in the Energy
Complex'. US Commodity Futures Trading Commission Working
Paper. Washington, D.C. 2005.
2  Cf. Testimony of James A. Overdahl, Chief Economist: 'US Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission Before the Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources', September 6, 2005, US Commodity
Futures Trading Commission web site: www.cftc.gov/files/opa/
opaoverdahl0105.pdf.
Table 1





Total OPEC1 Non-OPEC Change (%) on the previous year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (2) minus (1) (5) (6)
Million barrels per day %
2004 I 82.1 82.3 32.2 50.1 0.2 3.8 3.9
II 80.9 82.5 32.3 50.1 1.6 5.1 5.2
III 81.7 83.3 33.4 49.9 1.6 4.1 4.9
IV 83.8 84.2 33.9 50.3 0.4 2.0 3.1
2005 I 83.8 83.8 33.5 50.3 0.0 2.0 1.8
II 81.9 84.4 34.0 50.4 2.5 1.2 2.3
III 82.6 84.5 34.3 50.2 1.9 1.2 1.4
IV 85.6 85.9 34.3 51.6 0.3 2.1 2.0
2006 I 85.4 86.1 34.3 51.8 0.7 1.9 2.7
II 83.4 86.1 34.3 51.8 2.7 1.9 2.0
III 84.9 86.3 34.6 51.7 1.4 2.7 2.1
IV 87.3 86.8 34.8 52.0 –0.5 2.1 1.0
2002 77.7 76.9 28.8 48.1 –0.8 0.4 –0.4
2003 79.2 79.7 30.7 49.0 0.5 1.9 3.6
2004 82.1 83.1 33.0 50.1 1.0 3.7 4.3
2005 83.5 84.7 34.0 50.6 1.2 1.6 1.9
2006 85.3 86.3 34.5 51.8 1.1 2.1 2.0
1 Including Natural Gas Liquids (NGL).
Sources: IEA; 2005 and 2006: HWWA estimates.
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These stimulatory effects counteract the loss in pur-
chasing power determined by the oil-price rise in the
industrialized countries. Their importance has evi-
dently increased compared to the 1970s and 1980s,
for the world economy is now much more closely
interwoven with respect both to trade in goods and
the capital markets.6 Thus, the negative effect
exerted by the oil-price rise on the economies of the
oil-importing countries is likely to be somewhat
weaker now than in the 1970s and 1980s. The coun-
tries of Europe _ and especially Germany _ are bene-
fiting relatively substantially from the import 'pull'
from the oil-exporting countries because they main-
tain comparatively strong trade relations with them
(cf. table 3).
–   One important difference with respect to previous
oil-price rises is the fact that in the 1970s and also in
1990 the central banks had adopted a restrictive
course before the oil prices actually rose so as to pre-
vent the economy overheating and avoid an
extremely rapid upsurge in prices. In 2000, too, mon-
etary policy was tightened up appreciably in the
industrialized countries in order to counteract an
acceleration in inflation rates. Today, by contrast,
growth in the industrialized countries is still being
supported by extremely favorable monetary parame-
ters. In the euro zone and in Japan, short-term real
interest rates (calculated on the basis of the core
inflation rate) are still close to zero, while they are
also still low in the USA despite the increase in base
rates.
–   The reaction of wages, prices, and ultimately also
monetary policy to the oil-price shocks is utterly dif-
ferent to that in the 1970s and 1980s. In those years,
the unions tried to compensate for the loss in pur-
chasing power by pushing through wage increases;
as a result they triggered a wage-price spiral. Mone-
tary policy, which was already restrictive, was sub-
sequently tightened up even further. Today, by
contrast, wage growth is still extremely moderate,
which is why the inflationary pressure in the indus-
trialized countries is still modest, despite a lengthy
period of a highly expansive monetary policy and
unfavorable impulses from commodity prices. There
has also been practically no increase in inflationary
expectations to date. They have clearly been reduced
for the long term now that the central banks have
repeatedly demonstrated their determination over
the last two decades to react swiftly and comprehen-
sively to any sustained rise in inflation. Inflationary
expectations are probably also being curtailed by the
incorporation of new industrial regions into the
world economy; China deserves particular mention
in this context. This development has led to more
intense competition on the goods markets and has
significantly restricted the scope for price increases
6  On this subject, cf. R. Barrell and O. Pomerantz: 'Oil Prices and the
World Economy'. NIESR (National Institute of Economic and Social
Research) Discussion Paper, no. 242. London 2004; German Bundes-
bank, Monthly Report, May 2005; European Central Bank, Monthly
Bulletin, July 2005.
Table 2
Loss of Purchasing Power in the Industrialized 
Countries Induced by Oil and Gas Inflation 
During Phases of Sharp Oil-Price Increases1










USA 1.5 1.5 0.2 0.8 1.5
Japan 4.4 2.7 0.4 0.8 1.7
EU-15 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.7 1.3
Germany 2.5 2.5 0.5 0.8 1.6
1 Approximated by the change in net imports of oil, oil products, and natural gas
as % of GDP.
Sources: OECD; Institutes' calculations.
Figure 3
Oil Intensity1 of Production in 
Large Industrialized Countries
1970 to 2004; USA 1980 = 100
1 Oil consumption in barrels per day per unit of real GDP.
Sources: Energy Information Agency; Institutes' calculations.
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for a substantial quantity of tradable goods. This is
one of the factors behind the very moderate wage
agreements on the labor markets.
–   Another reason the dampening effects of the oil-price
rise are less visible is because long-term interest
rates are still very low and are therefore stimulating
economic growth. One of the main factors is the fact
that the supply of liquidity has remained very abun-
dant.7 Another factor that has exerted downward
pressure on interest rates has been the reflow of cap-
ital from countries with rising current account sur-
pluses _ especially China, but increasingly also the
oil-exporting countries. The latter are evidently hav-
ing little difficulty at the moment in 'recycling' reve-
nue from oil sales via the capital markets, unlike the
situation following the first two oil-price shocks.
–   Finally, world economic growth has also recently
been stimulated by the fact that asset prices have
risen sharply. This is a consequence of the robust
expansion of global liquidity, which is related to the
extremely low interest rates seen in recent years. On
the one hand, while inflation remained low for goods
prices, prices for loans rose sharply world wide. On
the other, property prices rose sharply in a range of
countries, and specifically in the USA. Favorable
financing conditions and the positive effects of the
rise in asset prices on the propensity to consume
have given a strong boost to growth in the industri-
alized countries in recent years. This was particu-
larly noticeable in the USA and until recently in
Great Britain,8 but also in some of the EMU coun-
tries.
Cautious tightening of monetary policy reins
The acceleration in inflation observed recently at the
consumer level has so far mainly been limited to energy
products. As long as no change can be expected in this
respect, the central banks will probably not raise their
interest rates in response to the oil-price rise. The pri-
mary concern of monetary policy makers is to avoid an
increase in inflationary expectations. Once expectations
have risen, correcting them is a long-drawn-out process
accompanied by high costs in the form of income and
employment losses.
Inflation of asset prices also harbors risks. On the
one hand, this inflation can after all spread to the goods
markets if the economy is boosted too vigorously by the
positive wealth effects. On the other, the rise in asset
prices might sooner or later turn out to be a bubble, and
when it bursts, the costs at macroeconomic level could
also be substantial.9
If monetary policy remains expansive for too long,
this can also have significant negative effects because
there is a risk that the anchor of stable inflationary
expectations may be lost. The central banks are likely to
start gradually scaling back their expansive course in
order to avert this danger.
In the USA, the Federal Reserve has already come a
long way towards achieving a neutral level of interest
rates. In view of the fact that utilization of productive
capacity is practically normal (and that inflationary
expectations have recently risen slightly) the Fed will
7  For a discussion of the trend for long-term interest rates, cf. Associa-
tion of German Economic Research Institutes: 'The World Economy
and the German Economy in the Spring of 2005'. In: DIW Berlin
Weekly Report, no. 14/2005.
Table 3
Exports from the Large Industrialized Countries to the Oil-Exporting Countries




Total OPEC Russia Mexico Norway
USA 120.7 139.6 24.3 3.0 110.8 1.6 1.1 1.2
Japan 26.3 33.2 23.8 3.1 5.2 1.1 0.6 0.7
Euro zone 130.6 159.8 82.2 44.3 15.7 17.5 1.6 1.7
Germany 42.1 53.9 22.8 18.6 6.1 6.4 1.7 2.0
Sources: OECD; Institutes' calculations.
8  The rise in residential property prices came to a halt in Great Britain
over the course of last year when the Bank of England switched to a
neutral stance. This adjustment contributed to the substantial cooling
down of the economy.
9  Examples are the situation in Japan in the 1990s and the aftermath of
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continue to raise base rates in small steps and will
switch to a virtually neutral course over the course of
next year. The ECB is likely to begin raising interest
rates over the course of 2006, but monetary policy will
still remain expansive nonetheless. The Japanese central
bank will initially maintain its policy of a zero interest
rate. But as growth consolidates and deflation begins to
abate, the bank will prepare the markets for a tightening
up of monetary policy.
The Institutes also expect long-term interest rates to
increase world wide. Thus, the monetary parameters
will gradually provide less stimulation for growth.
Fiscal policy neutral next year
The national debt has risen sharply in the industrialized
countries in recent years, and so most governments
have sought to reduce their deficits this year. The con-
solidation course pursued in the USA is likely to be
interrupted, however, by additional spending on recon-
struction following this summer's hurricanes. In most of
the other industrialized countries, fiscal policy will tend
to be restrictive in 2006. Thus, efforts to consolidate the
public budgets will be reinforced to an extent in Japan in
response to the improvement in the economy, but the
budget deficit will remain substantial.
The necessity for consolidation is considerable in the
euro zone and especially in the larger member states,
given that their deficit ratios have been exceeding the
maximum limit laid down in the Stability and Growth
Pact for several years now. But the structural deficit will
probably be reduced only slightly here, too. All in all,
the effect of fiscal policy in the industrialized countries
will be more or less neutral next year.
Outlook: ongoing brisk growth
Given these economic policy parameters, and under the
assumption that both oil prices and exchange rates will
basically remain constant, world economic growth is
likely to proceed at a somewhat slower pace over the
forecast period than in the first half of this year. The oil
price will continue to hamper growth for some time in
the oil-importing industrialized and industrializing
countries.
In the USA, the expansion of macroeconomic
demand will gradually lose pace. Private consumption,
in particular, will decline, for a start because the propen-
sity to save is likely to strengthen again as the rise in
property prices is slowed by the interest-rate trend. In
Japan, where the adjustment processes in the enterprise
and banking sectors are now bearing fruit, macroeco-
nomic output will remain on a decidedly upward trajec-
tory. In the euro zone, the economy will liven up slightly
as domestic demand recovers to an extent; investments,
in particular, will rise at a faster pace as a consequence
of the progress made in the reorganization of the enter-
prise sector. All in all, however, growth is likely to
remain moderate.
The rate of growth for real global GDP will amount
to over 3% in 2006 _ in other words, much the same as
this year (cf. table 4).10 The regional differences in the
pace of expansion will narrow slightly, but the dispari-
ties in the balance of payments will remain significant.
The Institutes expect inflation to flatten out again over
the course of next year, provided that the price of oil
does not rise any further. The decisive factor behind this
view is the expectation that wage growth, in light of the
persisting underutilization of macroeconomic capacities
in the industrialized countries, will probably remain
moderate.
Risks
This forecast of the world economic trend harbors risks
on both sides, and not only because the future of oil
prices is uncertain. The economic trend could be more
positive if long-term interest rates in the USA remain as
unusually low as they are today, despite the tightening
up of monetary policy. The slowdown in the price
increases for residential property would then probably
be weaker than assumed here, and the stimulation of
private consumption would continue _ albeit at the cost
of a greater risk of a setback in future years.
A more genuine risk is the danger that the pace of
economic growth might be weaker than forecast here.
Thus, the accelerated inflation of recent months as a
consequence of the higher price for oil could yet lead to
stronger wage growth. This would lead monetary policy
makers to tighten the monetary policy reins more
sharply than predicted.
The imbalances in the world economy are other
ongoing potential sources of danger. The high current
account deficit in the USA, which has grown further this
year, could become increasingly difficult to finance
because a very large share of the portfolios of foreign
investors already consists of claims on the US economy.
A reduced propensity to invest capital in the USA could
lead to a substantial rise in US interest rates, which
would constitute a burden for private consumption and
investments.
10  This rate refers to the group of countries listed in table 4, where the
growth rates were weighted by 2004 nominal GDP in US dollars. This
growth rate is not entirely comparable with other figures on world eco-
nomic growth _ for example, those of the International Monetary Fund
_ whose weighting is based on purchasing power parities and which
also include the rest of the world.378 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005
The possibility of a significant depreciation of the
US dollar also cannot be excluded. Resulting higher
import costs could rapidly lead to a higher inflation rate,
which would induce the Fed to raise base rates more
promptly. But if the US economy were to cool down sub-
stantially, then the world economy would lose its most
important economic engine. Moreover, higher interest
rates in the USA would probably produce interest-rate
increases in other countries, too, and not least in the
industrializing countries, so that macroeconomic growth
would be dampened there as well.
USA: gradual slowdown in 
economic growth
The growth dynamic in the USA has turned out to be
extremely robust. Real GDP has continued to grow
unwaveringly over the course of 2005 at an annual rate
of around 3.5% (cf. figure 4). The expansion of private
consumption has slowed down only slightly. Although
the increase in energy prices substantially diminished
the purchasing power of private households, the loss
was almost entirely offset by a further decline in the
savings ratio, which was also due in no small part to the
rise in property prices.
Investment in residential construction expanded
robustly once again, while spending on machinery and
software, which had continued to suffer in the first few
months of the year following the expiry at the end of
2004 of special tax write-offs for new equipment, has
since rapidly increased again.
While export growth accelerated, import growth has
recently slowed considerably, so that for the first time in
almost two years there was no increase in the import
surplus. The hurricanes seem to have had practically no
negative impact on the momentum of growth (cf. box 2).
The situation on the labor market has greatly
improved once again. However, despite the strong rise
in employment over the course of the year, the unem-
ployment rate decreased only slightly because of the
simultaneous rise in the number of job-seekers.
Inflation has continued to strengthen significantly,
in particular as a result of the higher oil prices; the infla-
tion rate at the consumer level amounted to 3.6% in
August. Core inflation,11 by contrast, has remained
Table 4







Change (%) on the previous year
2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006
E U - 2 5 3 5 . 22 . 41 . 62 . 12 . 02 . 22 . 19 . 29 . 08 . 7
S w i t z e r l a n d 1 . 02 . 11 . 52 . 00 . 81 . 20 . 64 . 44 . 03 . 8
N o r w a y 0 . 72 . 92 . 83 . 00 . 41 . 92 . 14 . 44 . 34 . 1
Western and central Europe 36.9 2.4 1.6 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.9 8.9 8.7 8.4
U S A 3 2 . 14 . 23 . 63 . 32 . 73 . 53 . 35 . 55 . 14 . 8
J a p a n 1 2 . 82 . 62 . 32 . 50 . 0 – 0 . 10 . 24 . 74 . 44 . 2
C a n a d a 2 . 72 . 92 . 92 . 81 . 82 . 32 . 37 . 26 . 86 . 7
Industrialized countries 84.5 3.1 2.5 2.6 1.9 2.3 2.2 7.1 6.8 6.5
Russia 1.6 7.2 6.0 5.5 11.0 13.0 12.0 8.3 8.0 8.0
East Asia1 4 . 75 . 54 . 04 . 5 . . . . . .
China 4.5 9.5 9.2 8.5 . . . . . .
Latin America2 4 . 75 . 94 . 03 . 5 . . . . . .
Newly industrializing countries 15.5 7.0 5.7 5.5 . . . . . .
Total3 100.0 3.7 3.0 3.1 . . . . . .
Memo item: 
Weighted by exports4 100.0 3.1 2.3 2.6 . . . . . .
World trade, real – 8.0 6.5 7.0 – – – – – –
1 Weighted average comprising: South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines. Weighted by 2004 GDP in US dollars. — 2 Weighted average
comprising: Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Columbia, Venezuela, Chile. Weighted by 2004 GDP in US dollars. — 3 Total of countries listed. Weighted by 2004 GDP in US dollars.
— 4 Total of countries listed. Weighted by countries' shares in German exports in 2004.
Sources: Eurostat; IMF; OECD; Institutes' calculations; 2005 and 2006: Institutes' forecast.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005  379
almost constant, amounting to just over 2% since the
beginning of the year. However, inflationary expecta-
tions recently began to increase.
Against this background, and in light of the steady
pace of growth, the Fed raised interest rates again, not-
withstanding the uncertainty regarding the economic
effects of the hurricanes. In September, the target value
for the Federal Funds Rate was raised by another 25
basis points to 3.75%. Thus, the increase since June last
year amounts to a total of 275 basis points, and the
short-term real interest rate _ calculated on the basis of
the core inflation rate _ has therefore risen. Moreover,
the US dollar has appreciated again slightly since the
beginning of the year.
Nonetheless, the monetary parameters will continue
to boost growth. In particular, financing conditions on
the capital market are still favorable because long-term
interest rates have hardly reacted at all to the rise in
short-term rates.
The Institutes expect the Fed to continue to raise
base rates in small steps until they reach 4.75% by the
middle of next year. In view of the strong pace of
growth and the high inflationary expectations, long-
term interest rates are also likely to rise perceptibly _ to
over 5%. Then the effect of the monetary parameters
will be almost neutral.
Fiscal policy in the fiscal year 2005, which ended on
September 30, was slightly restrictive. The unexpect-
edly hefty reduction in the federal budget deficit _ to
2.6% of GDP, compared to around 3.6% the previous
year _ was due to a sizeable increase in revenue from
income tax and corporation tax. And the reduction
would have been even larger if not for the expenditure
related to September's hurricanes. The government had
planned to maintain its restrictive course in the fiscal
year 2006. However, it is now doubtful that spending
will be reduced as intended. In fact, the defense budget
will probably be increased, given that spending on the
military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan has not
yet been included in the budget plans. Moreover, sub-
stantial additional funds will be allocated for repairs
necessitated by the hurricanes. All in all, the deficit is
likely to increase to around 3% of GDP in the current
fiscal year.
Against the background of less favorable monetary
parameters and a significant rise in oil prices, the US
economy will lose momentum during the course of the
forecast period. Private consumption, especially, will
expand at a slower pace. The main reason will be the
likely gradual rise in the savings ratio because, as inter-
est rates rise, consumer loans will become more costly
and the increase in property prices will weaken.
In addition, real disposable income will expand only
moderately due to the rising prices. Investment activity
will be dampened by the increase in long-term interest
rates and slightly gloomier sales and profitability expec-
tations. On the other hand, exports will be bolstered by
improved price competitiveness, while imports will no
longer expand as substantially because overall demand
will be weaker. The current account deficit will remain
high both this year and next year. At the same time,
payments by foreign insurance companies for hurricane
damages can be expected over the coming months, and
this will distort the trend for the current account.
All in all, in 2006 real GDP will increase at more or
less its potential rate of growth: 3.3% (compared to
3.6% this year) (cf. table 5). The unemployment rate is
likely to decrease only slightly as employment continues
to rise. The inflation rate will amount to an average
3.3% in 2006, and thus will be about as high as this
year. While the impact of the sharp rise in energy prices
will gradually abate, core inflation is likely to increase
slightly.
Japan back on track
Real GDP in Japan expanded robustly again in the first
half of 2005, following a temporary deceleration over the
11  The core inflation rate is measured as the rate of change of the Har-
monized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), not including energy and
unprocessed foodstuffs
Figure 4
Real GDP in the USA
Seasonally adjusted
1 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualized rate (right-hand scale). — 2 Fig-
ures: change (%) of the original values on the previous year.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Institutes' calculations; from 3rd quarter
2005 onwards: Institutes' forecast.
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course of last year (cf. figure 5). Part of the reason was
more rapid growth in external demand. In particular,
however, domestic demand grew sharply. Private con-
sumption expanded significantly as real incomes rose.
Enterprise investments rose at double-figure rates in
consequence of greatly increased profits, and also in
view of the fact that enterprises have evidently made
substantial progress in consolidating their balance
sheets. At the same time, the labor market situation also
showed a further improvement. The unemployment rate
amounted to 4.3% in August and was therefore half a
percentage point lower than a year previously.
The deflationary tendencies appear to be gradually
abating; the last decrease in the consumer price index
was mainly a result of a fall in rice prices. Prices have
already been rising at the producer level since the begin-
ning of 2004. In addition, share prices have recovered
considerably from their low point in 2003, while prop-
erty prices recently also began to rise. These develop-
ments have helped to bring about a sustained improve-
ment in the situation in the financial sector. Thus, the
volume of credit, which had been in decline for many
years, is now rising again. As prices rise again slightly
over the course of next year, the expansive impact of
monetary policy will strengthen.
Against this background, the central bank is likely
to gradually trim down the unusually generous supply
of liquid funds to the commercial banks. However, it is
still likely to maintain its policy of zero interest rates for
the present. Fiscal policy, by contrast, will have an
increasingly restrictive effect as the efforts to consoli-
date the public budgets are likely to be reinforced. On
the one hand, spending, and especially spending on pub-
lic investments, will be cut back. On the other, there are
signs that the reduction in income-tax rates introduced
to boost growth in 1999 will be at least partly reversed
again next year.
All in all, economic expansion can be expected to
proceed briskly in Japan this year and next year.
Growth will continue to be based primarily on domestic
demand, private consumption will continue to expand
substantially as the labor market situation improves
and incomes keep rising, and investments will grow
robustly as a result of the improvement in sales and
profitability expectations.
Exports, by contrast, will probably grow at a
slightly slower pace in view of the somewhat weaker
expansion of external demand. Real GDP is likely to
grow by almost 2.5% both this year and next year (cf.
table 6).
The macroeconomic impact of the hurricanes
The Gulf region of the USA was hit by Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita at the end of August and end of September 2005,
respectively. Official estimates set the damage at around
US $ 140 billion, which is many times worse than the damage
inflicted by past hurricanes. The consequences for the overall
economy are also particularly severe this time because the
region concerned is extremely important for national energy
supply. The temporary outage of around a quarter of crude oil
production in the USA and of a substantial share of refinery
capacities led to a momentary dramatic rise in energy and
gasoline prices world wide.
The destruction of production facilities was accompanied by
significant job loss in the region and therefore a related
decline in income. While the first figures available on job loss
have proven to be much lower than initially feared (the
national unemployment rate rose as a result from 4.9% to
5.1%), it is also certain that not all job losses have yet been
recorded by any means. However, the demand for labor will
expand again in the course of the damage-repair and recon-
struction activities.
The impact of the hurricanes on the public budgets will be sig-
nificant. One consequence will be income losses, but another,
more significant effect, will be substantial public spending on
infrastructure repairs and on compensation for non-insured
damages. Congress has already approved US $ 62.3 billion
for damage repairs relating to the two hurricanes, but the
actual sum required to cover the state's total costs will proba-
bly be much higher. However, the allocation of the funds will
be spread out over several years, and some of the resources
will be raised through budget restructuring. All in all, an
increase of around US $ 100 billion in the budget deficit can
be expected in the fiscal year 2006.
The consequences of the hurricane are likely to influence the
macroeconomic trend in the USA in the second half of this
year and throughout next year. In the short term, the produc-
tion losses, on the one hand, and the higher prices for energy
and fuel, on the other, will have a negative impact. These two
effects will substantially curb private consumption, in particu-
lar. It can be assumed that the situation in the energy sector
will normalize by the end of the year and that energy prices by
then will have fallen again substantially.
In addition, the process of reconstruction will increasingly
generate expansive impulses. A part of the additional demand
will initially be absorbed by stock reductions and by imports,
so that domestic production will not be stimulated in full. On
balance, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita will curtail the expan-
sion of macroeconomic output by around 0.3 percentage
points in the second half of 2005.1 Next year, the positive
effects on demand are likely to prevail. However, they will still
not be strong enough to fully offset the slowdown in the
growth of macroeconomic output and demand.
1  Cf. Congressional Budget Office: 'Testimony before the Committee
on the Budget'. Washington, D.C., 6 October 2005.
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Slight weakening of momentum in 
industrializing countries
East Asia: robust increase in Chinese output
Once again in 2005, China was the growth center in the
East Asian economic area. The growth dynamic in most
of the other countries of the region was quite temperate,
by contrast. In the smaller economies, the weaker
momentum in demand for IT goods, which are particu-
larly important for East Asia, had been noticeable since
fall of last year. Trade in these goods has developed
more robustly again since the summer, but now the
renewed increase in the price of oil is proving to be a
burden, especially because the energy intensity of pro-
duction is extremely high in the industrializing coun-
tries of East Asia. The public budgets have been hard
hit in many countries, for example in those, such as
Indonesia and Malaysia, where crude-oil products have
been greatly subsidized.
Output growth in China remained robust despite the
rise in energy prices. However, there were sizeable dis-
placements on the demand side: While the substantial
growth of real exports persisted in the first half of the
year, import growth, for example for crude oil and
investment goods, weakened considerably. In the latter
case, the measures implemented to contain last year's
overheated investment growth left their mark. Economic
policy makers also succeeded in curtailing the expan-
sion of the volume of credit and of money supply (on the
narrow definition), and consumer prices also stabilized
as a result. However, to a large extent this was also a
consequence of good harvests; foodstuffs are still a very
important component of the Chinese consumer's shop-
ping basket.
The dampening measures saved the Chinese econ-
omy from overheating, but they exacerbated the imbal-
ance between the internal and the external economy.
The current account surplus is currently 6% of GDP. In
addition, capital is still flowing into the country in the
form of foreign direct investment and speculative
finances. The central bank was forced to stock up its
currency reserves by another US $ 100 billion in the first
half of 2005 so as to maintain a stable exchange rate
against the US dollar; this corresponded to around 10%
of Chinese GDP in this period. At the same time, far-
reaching sterilization measures prevented the monetary
base from expanding and for the moment have averted
the inflationary risks that go hand in hand with this
type of trend.
The abandonment in June of the renminbi's strict
peg to the US dollar will do little to remedy the external
imbalance for the moment, to begin with because the
appreciation of 2.1% against the US dollar was too
insignificant to make any difference in this respect (cf.
box 3).
The reform of the exchange-rate regime will be sig-
nificant in the long term, however. Alongside the liberal-
Table 5
USA: Key Forecast Figures
2003 2004 2005 2006
Change (%) on the previous year
Real GDP 2.7 4.2 3.6 3.3
Private consumption 2.9 3.7 3.5 3.0
Government consumption and 
investment 2.8 2.2 2.5 2.0
Private capital investments 3.9 11.9 5.6 6.9
Domestic demand 3.0 4.8 3.7 3.4
Exports 1.8 8.4 8.2 7.1
Imports 4.6 10.7 6.8 6.6
External surplus/deficit1 –0.5 –0.8 –0.2 –0.3
Consumer prices 2.3 2.7 3.5 3.3
As % of nominal GDP
Budget surplus/deficit2 –3.7 –3.5 –2.5 –2.8
Balance of payments –4.7 –5.7 –6.3 –6.3
As % of labor force
Unemployment rate 6.0 5.5 5.1 4.8
1 Contribution to growth. — 2 Total government surplus/deficit.
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Insti-
tutes' calculations; 2005 and 2006: Institutes' forecast.
Figure 5
Real GDP in Japan
Seasonally adjusted
1 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualized rate (right-hand scale). — 2 Fig-
ures: change (%) of the original values on the previous year.
Sources: Cabinet Office; Institutes' calculations; from 3rd quarter 2005 onwards:
Institutes' forecast.
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ization measures on the exchange market, it represents
another step on the road towards Chinese financial sec-
tor's alignment with the international capital markets.
The number of large foreign banks with shares in Chi-
nese partner banks indicates confidence in this process.
Macroeconomic activity will diminish only slightly
over the forecast period, despite somewhat weaker
export growth, as private consumption expands at a
slightly stronger pace. Chinese output is likely to
increase by over 9% this year and by 8.5% in 2006.
Domestic demand will accelerate slightly in the remain-
ing countries of East Asia.
High oil price bolsters Russian economy
Russia is benefiting this year from the prices rises on the
energy markets, but the pace of economic growth has
slowed nonetheless. Investment growth has not been as
substantial as last year, probably in part because pri-
vate investors were frightened off by the massive inter-
ventions by the state in the energy industry. Private
consumption also failed to expand quite as rapidly as
last year. As domestic demand growth slowed, imports
did not increase as robustly as previously. The decline
in real exports strengthened significantly, in part as a
consequence of the real appreciation of the ruble.
Inflation increased at rates of around 12.5%. It was
driven upwards by the fact that the Russian central
bank responded to the appreciation of the ruble by buy-
ing large quantities of foreign currency. As a result,
domestic money supply, and thus also inflationary
potential, increased. A large portion of the revenue from
oil transactions is skimmed off and channeled into a sta-
bilization fund. At the end of the last fiscal year, the
Table 6
Japan: Key Forecast Figures
2003 2004 2005 2006
Change (%) on the previous year
Real GDP 1.4 2.6 2.3 2.5
Private consumption 0.2 1.5 1.8 1.9
Government consumption and 
investment –1.9 –0.6 –0.7 –0.6
Private capital investments 1.1 1.5 3.3 3.4
Domestic demand 0.8 1.8 2.0 2.1
Exports 9.1 14.5 6.2 8.1
Imports 3.8 8.9 6.2 5.3
External surplus/deficit1 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.5
Consumer prices –0.2 0.0 –0.1 0.2
As % of nominal GDP
Budget surplus/deficit2 –7.4 –6.2 –6.1 –5.5
Balance of payments 3.2 3.7 3.5 3.3
As % of labor force
Unemployment rate 5.3 4.7 4.4 4.2
1 Contribution to growth. — 2 Total government surplus/deficit.
Sources: Cabinet Office; OECD; Institutes' calculations; 2005 and 2006: Insti-
tutes' forecast.
China's new exchange-rate regime
The expansion of China's currency reserves has been indi-
cating for quite some time now that the renminbi is underval-
ued. Last July, China abandoned the fixed exchange rate
that has existed since the 1990s between the renminbi and
the US dollar and appreciated its currency by 2.1%. The
Chinese central bank has described the new exchange-rate
regime as a 'managed floating' system. The external value
of the renminbi will be regulated in relation to a basket of
currencies, whose individual weighting will not be made
known. However, it has been hinted that the US dollar, the
euro, the yen, and the Korean won will be the dominant cur-
rencies – in accordance with their importance as the curren-
cies of China's main trading partners.1 The exchange rate's
daily fluctuation band against the US dollar will be limited to
±0.3%.2
This last regulation means that the renminbi could appreci-
ate by more than 5% against the US dollar within a single
month. In actual fact, however, the new exchange rate of
around 8.11 yuan renminbi per US dollar has practically
remained constant since July,3 whereas the fluctuations in
the exchange rates against the other currencies have been
much stronger. At the moment, therefore, China's new
exchange rate policy looks much like the old version. The
appreciation in July is also too insignificant to noticeably
reduce the current account surplus. The only effect for the
moment of China's currency policy reform, therefore, has
been to expand its room for maneuver; however, it is not
clear when and to what extent this room for maneuver will
actually be used. Moreover, as a consequence of the Chi-
nese government's currency reform, Malaysia has now also
switched from a fixed dollar peg exchange-rate regime to a
system of 'managed floating'. The ringit has since been fluc-
tuating much more powerfully against the US dollar than the
renminbi.
1  The currencies of Singapore, Malaysia, Russia, Australia, Thailand,
and Canada will also be included in the basket.
2  The tolerance level for daily fluctuation against the other currencies
was set so high that in all likelihood the exchange rates will never
reach the maximum fluctuation limits. 3  It has strengthened by around 0.2% against the US dollar.
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government budget therefore showed a surplus of
around 5% of GDP.
A much more expansive fiscal policy course is
planned for next year. Some of the stabilization fund is
to be used for health care, and a massive increase in
wages and salaries in the public sector is also on the
agenda. Nonetheless, the pace of growth is likely to slow
down slightly from 6% this year to 5.5% next year
because the strong appreciation of the ruble will reduce
the competitiveness of Russian producers.
Weaker upturn in Latin America
The upturn in the Latin American economy has slowed
down perceptibly over the course of this year, to an
extent because commodity prices (with the exception of
energy prices) no longer showed any substantial
increase. In addition, inflationary risks damaged the eco-
nomic climate in many countries. In Brazil, especially,
and briefly also in Mexico, the central banks adopted
restrictive measures that dampened domestic demand.
Fiscal policy is also geared towards stability in most
of the countries, and efforts are continuing to reduce the
government budget deficits. Many countries have cur-
rent account surpluses, partly thanks to the high com-
modity prices, and foreign currency reserves are increas-
ing appreciably. Nonetheless, the region's foreign debt
remains a risk that could rapidly escalate if interest
rates rise in the USA and the risk premium for loans
from the industrializing countries increases.
All in all, the growth of macroeconomic output in
Latin America is likely to slow down slightly. Real GDP
will increase by 4% this year and by 3.5% next year.
The rise in prices is likely to weaken again slightly in
connection with the stability-oriented monetary and fis-
cal policies.
Excursus: the macroeconomic effects 
of the oil-price rises – evidence on the 
basis of macroeconometric models
Macroeconometric models are an important instrument
for assessing the macroeconomic effects of changes in
the price of oil. They are used to understand and illus-
trate on the basis of empirical data the impact of rising
crude-oil prices on supply and demand in the national
economy and also the interdependencies between the
two sides of the market. On the supply side, the produc-
tion of goods becomes more costly in the oil-importing
countries as the cost of imported intermediate goods
rises. The result, if the higher costs cannot be passed on
in full, is a compression of profits, which in turn curtails
the propensity to invest. On the demand side, price rises
engender a reduction in purchasing power, which
results in turn in a weaker growth dynamic. Together
these two effects tend to lead to lower output and
employment. The models also use estimated or fixed
rules regarding the reaction of the social partners to an
oil-price shock, for example whether a rise in inflation
sets off a wage-price spiral or whether monetary policy
makers feel compelled to adopt a more restrictive course
as a result of higher inflation. In multi-country models,
the recycling of oil monies via the international goods
and capital markets is also taken into account, given
that these models have modules for the most important
industrialized countries and for the group of oil-export-
ing countries.
Numerous simulations based on such models have
been published recently on the impact of the oil-price
rise, for example by the OECD, the IMF, and the IEA. So
far, the outcomes of these simulations have varied sub-
stantially. For instance, an IEA estimation using the
OECD Interlink model found that an increase in the
price of crude oil by US $ 10 per barrel ($/b) would
dampen GDP in the USA by 0.3 percentage points each
year for the first two years, but would dampen GDP in
the euro zone in each of the first two years by 0.5 per-
centage points.12 By contrast, the models used below
find that the effect would be stronger in the USA than in
the euro zone. The estimation of the impact over time of
an oil-price rise also varies. An IMF calculation carried
out in 2000 using the MULTIMOD model found that a
price increase of 5 $/b in the USA _ and of a similar
dimension in the euro zone _ would reduce growth by
0.3 percentage points in the first year and by a further
0.1 percentage points in the following year.13 Since
spring 2005, the IMF has been basing its estimates on
calculations carried out using a more recent version of
MULTIMOD, according to which a rise in oil prices by
around 30 $/b to 80 $/b would reduce growth in the
USA by 0.8 percentage points.14
However, the calculations are often difficult to com-
pare because they are based on different assumptions
regarding the price of oil and on different exchange-rate
scenarios, and because they observe different shocks,
presenting the conclusions in some cases as a percent-
age rise and in others as a price increase measured in US
12  International Energy Agency: 'Analysis of the Impact of High Oil
Prices on the Global Economy'. Paris, May 2004, p. 9.
13  M. Mussa: 'The Impact of Higher Oil Prices on the Global Economy'.
International Monetary Fund Research Department. Washington, D.C.,
December 2000, p. 18.
14  A. Allen: 'Oil Market Developments and Issues'. International Mone-
tary Fund Policy Development and Review Department. Washington,
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dollars. Thus, the findings cannot be interpreted inde-
pendently of the period concerned. In addition, the pol-
icy assumptions underlying the simulations also vary
on occasion; moreover, these are not always well docu-
mented.
In these models, the role of monetary policy is impor-
tant with respect to the macroeconomic reaction to the
oil-price rise. If monetary policy does not react to the
increase in inflation induced by the oil price (i.e., it is
'exogenous'), then real interest rates decrease and invest-
ment is stimulated. In some models the change in rela-
tive import prices induced by the oil-price rise leads to
an excessive decline in imports, which results in turn in
only a minor decline in growth. The reason is that these
models do not differentiate between core inflation and
actual inflation. The resulting reaction is implausible,
however, because higher oil prices ultimately lead to a
deterioration in the supply conditions. Simulations are
also carried out using 'endogenous' monetary policy, in
which the central banks react to a rise in inflation by
increasing their base rates. They generally adhere to the
Taylor rule, although this is likely to do justice only to a
limited extent to actual reactions to an exogenous price
shock. Thus, the ECB, for example, has stressed that it
will only raise interest rates if the oil-price rise leads to
recognizable second-round effects.
Whether second-round effects transpire or not basi-
cally depends on wages policy. The simulations can be
based on the assumption of 'endogenous' wage forma-
tion, in which wages react positively to higher inflation.
An 'exogenous' wages policy, by contrast, means that
wages grow in the same way as they would have with-
out the oil-price thrust. In model calculations with
endogenous wage formation, the higher oil price leads,
especially in the USA, to significant inflation growth _
which seems plausible in view of the higher utilization
of labor force potential there compared to the euro zone.
Combined with an endogenous monetary policy, the
result is a substantial decline in growth.
Generally the findings also vary depending on
whether the actors behave with foresight or not. In the
case of rational and forward-looking economic units, the
short-term effects of a temporary oil-price shock are
comparatively weaker because, for example, the shock
has a less significant effect on the permanent income of
private households.
In the following, the Institutes present their own sim-
ulations using two multi-country models: Oxford Eco-
nomic Forecasting's OEF model, and the National Insti-
tute for Economic and Social Research's NiGEM model.
The simulations observe the impact of a long-term
increase of 30 $/b in the price of crude oil from the
beginning of 2006 onwards; the basic solutions of the
models are based on the assumption that the price of
crude oil will amount to around 54 $/b next year. Each
of the calculations are based on the assumption of
endogenous monetary and wages policy in a context of
autoregressive expectations. Under these assumptions,
the impact on inflation of an oil-price rise is much higher
in the USA in both models than in the euro zone or Ger-
many, even given a counter-reaction by the central
bank. This is probably also due in part to the much
higher energy intensity of the American economy. In the
euro zone, the price increase already wears off in the
third year after the disruption (cf. table 7). Accordingly,
both nominal and real interest rates rise at a sharper
rate in the USA, which leads to a more severe curtail-
ment of GDP growth. However, these calculations are
also based on the assumption that wage policy will
behave similarly to previous phases of rising inflation,
which is not necessarily the case. The NiGEM model
shows higher income losses in general for the USA than
the OEF model. The two models indicate similar initial
reactions in the euro zone and Germany, but the shock is
overcome much more rapidly in the OEF model. It is
possible that the NiGEM model would provide effects
for the USA that are comparable with the OEF model if
it were based on rational expectations. This is at least
indicated by the results of the simulations carried out by
Barrell and Pomerantz.15
15  R. Barrell and O. Pomerantz: 'Oil Prices and the World Economy'.
Discussion Paper, no. 242 (December 2004), National Institute for Eco-
nomic and Social Research (NIESR). London 2004, p. 19 ff.
Table 7
Macroeconomic Consequences of a 
30 $/b Increase in the Price of Oil
Deviation of growth rates from basic solution in percentage 
points
GDP Consumer prices
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 1st year 2nd year 3rd year
NiGEM
USA –0.1 –0.9 –1.3 +0.9 +1.8 +1.5
Euro zone –0.3 –0.3 –0.5 +0.7 +0.9 +0.7
Germany –0.4 –0.4 –0.5 +0.5 +0.3 0.0
OEF
USA –0.5 –0.9 –0.8 +1.0 +0.8 +0.5
Euro zone –0.5 –0.2 +0.1 +0.8 +0.3 0.0
Germany –0.4 –0.3 0.0 +0.4 +0.2 0.0
Source: Institutes' calculations based on model default settings (OEF model of
August 2005; NiGEM Version 305 of July 2005), including endogenous monetary
policy rules; NiGEM model incorporates autoregressive expectations.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005  385
The Economy of the 
European Union
Slow recovery in the euro zone 
The pace of growth in the euro zone is still very slow. In
the first half of 2005, domestic demand was dampened
by the high oil price, while the effect of the euro's appre-
ciation continued to be felt. There was little further
expansion of private consumption. Investment growth
remained negligible, although the profit situation is
favorable and interest rates are extremely low. Capacity
utilization continued to decline, so that there was no
decisive upturn in investment activity. Exports recov-
ered during the first half of the year. Demand from the
new member states of the European Union and other
European countries increased particularly sharply.
Exports to the oil-exporting countries, especially Russia,
rose appreciably.
The trends for the individual member states
remained very diverse (cf. table 8). While real GDP rose
Table 8






Change (%) on the previous year
2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006
Germany3 21.4 1.6 0.8 1.2 1.8 2.1 2.0 9.5 9.5 9.3
France 15.9 2.3 1.5 1.8 2.3 2.0 2.0 9.7 9.7 9.5
Italy 13.0 1.2 0.1 1.0 2.3 2.1 2.1 8.0 7.8 7.5
Spain 8.1 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.1 11.0 9.6 9.2
The Netherlands 4.7 1.7 0.7 2.5 1.4 1.5 1.0 4.6 4.8 4.6
Belgium 2.7 2.9 1.4 1.9 1.9 2.6 2.1 7.8 8.0 7.8
Austria 2.3 2.4 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.1 1.9 4.8 5.1 5.0
Finland 1.6 4.2 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.4 3.2 10.5 10.0 9.7
Greece 1.4 3.6 1.5 3.2 0.1 0.8 1.4 8.8 8.4 8.1
Portugal 1.4 4.5 4.6 4.8 2.3 2.2 2.1 4.5 4.3 4.1
Ireland 1.4 1.2 0.9 1.7 2.5 2.2 2.4 6.7 7.2 7.0
Luxembourg 0.2 4.5 3.9 4.1 3.2 3.6 2.8 4.8 4.9 4.7
EMU countries4 74.3 2.1 1.3 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.1 8.8 8.6 8.4
United Kingdom 16.6 3.2 1.9 2.5 1.3 2.1 1.9 4.7 4.6 4.4
Sweden 2.7 3.6 2.5 2.6 1.0 0.8 1.5 6.3 6.1 5.9
Denmark 1.9 2.4 2.2 2.3 0.9 1.5 1.7 5.4 5.0 5.0
EU-154 95.4 2.3 1.5 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.0 8.3 8.1 7.8
Poland 1.9 5.4 3.3 4.3 3.6 2.5 2.5 18.8 18.1 17.8
Czech Republic 0.8 4.4 4.6 4.2 2.6 1.8 2.2 8.3 8.0 7.8
Hungary 0.8 4.2 3.6 3.7 6.8 3.7 2.0 5.9 6.5 6.2
Slovakia 0.3 5.5 5.0 5.2 7.4 2.8 3.0 18.0 17.5 17.0
Slovenia 0.3 4.6 4.0 4.0 3.6 2.8 2.8 6.0 6.0 5.8
Lithuania 0.2 7.0 6.4 6.5 1.1 2.5 2.3 10.8 10.0 9.5
Cyprus 0.1 3.7 3.5 3.9 1.9 2.5 2.5 5.0 5.0 4.8
Latvia 0.1 8.3 9.0 7.5 6.2 6.5 5.5 9.8 9.2 8.5
Estonia 0.1 7.8 8.0 6.5 3.0 3.7 3.0 9.2 9.0 8.5
Malta 0.0 0.4 1.5 1.8 2.7 2.5 2.5 7.3 6.7 6.4
Accession states 4.6 5.1 4.1 4.4 4.1 2.7 2.5 14.1 13.7 13.4
EU-254 100.0 2.4 1.6 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.1 9.2 9.0 8.7
Memo item: 
Weighted by exports5 100.0 2.7 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.3 – – –
1 EU-15: harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP). — 2 Standardized. — 3 The different growth rates are not entirely comparable because in some countries they have
been adjusted for the number of working days, while in others – e.g., Germany – they have not. The working-day effect was particularly strong in Germany in 2004 at 0.5%;
thus, purely cyclical growth only amounted to 1.1% in this case. — 4 Total of countries listed. GDP and consumer prices weighted by 2004 GDP in US dollars; unemployment
rate weighted by 2003 labor force. — 5 Total of countries listed. Weighted by country's shares in German exports in 2004.
Sources: Eurostat; IMF; OECD; Federal Statistical Office; Institutes' calculations; 2005 and 2006: Institutes' forecast.386 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005
again sharply in Spain, Italy made only a slight recov-
ery from recession. And the forces behind economic
growth are also very varied. In most cases, growth is
borne by domestic demand. In Spain and France, the
construction sector still plays an important role, also
because property prices are rising sharply.
In Germany and Austria, by contrast, the dominant
force is foreign demand. While the external balance is
rising in these two countries, it is falling in most of the
other EMU countries because of an unfavorable export
structure and a decline in price competitiveness com-
pared to the countries of Asia. The difference in the
export dynamic is also reflected by divergent trends for
industrial output, which is much stronger in Germany
and Austria than in the rest of the euro zone.
Employment in the euro zone is continuing to show
a slight increase, especially as it is continuing to rise
robustly in Spain and in Italy (despite the weak econ-
omy in the latter country). Almost all the EU countries
are demonstrating significant shifts in their employment
structure. The steady and marked decline of employ-
ment in industry is being more than offset by employ-
ment growth in the private and public service sectors.
The unemployment rate changed only insignificantly in
the euro zone, amounting to 8.6% in August.
Inflation has recently strengthened. The inflation
rate, measured on the basis of the Harmonized Index of
Consumer Prices, jumped to 2.6% in September, having
amounted to 2% in the preceding months. A large part
of the increase can be attributed to the higher energy
prices, which rose by 15.2%. The core inflation rate was
1.5% on the most recent figures; its trend reflects the
weak growth dynamic, on the one hand, and, on the
other, the strong competitive pressure from Asia as a
consequence of the liberalization of foreign trade, espe-
cially in the textile sector.
Wage growth remained moderate overall. There is
no sign of acceleration with respect to negotiated wages.
Compensation of employees per employee continued to
rise moderately (at around 2%) in the first half of the
year. However, the differences between the large coun-
tries remained sizeable. While Compensation of employ-
ees per employee once again hardly rose at all in Ger-
many, and the increase in Italy was slightly below the
average for the euro zone, wage growth amounted to
around 3% in France and Spain.
Fiscal policy still almost neutral in the euro zone 
This year _ like last year _ the aggregate public budget
deficit for the euro zone will amount to 2.8% of nominal
GDP (cf. table 9). The failure of the aggregate deficit to
decline, despite the efforts to consolidate the budgets,
can be primarily ascribed to the weak economic trend;
the structural deficit will actually be slightly reduced.
A reduction in the deficit is unlikely in view of the
only modest economic recovery.16 The three largest
economies in the euro zone (Germany, France, and Italy)
as well as Greece and Portugal will violate the 3% defi-
cit limit stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty, although
the structural deficits in these countries will probably be
slightly reduced. All in all, fiscal policy will remain prac-
tically neutral.
ECB likely to raise interest rates next year
The monetary parameters improved slightly in the euro
zone over the past six months. The ECB left base rates
untouched at their low level; the minimum bid rate for
main refinancing transactions has been 2% for over two
years now. In recent months, the interest rate for ninety-
day loans has fluctuated only slightly around its current
value of 2.2% (cf. figure 6). When deflated by the current
core inflation rate,17 it amounts to 0.9% and is therefore
16  Possible corrections of what are considered by Eurostat and the
European Commission to be erroneous entries in the national accounts
are not taken into consideration here. Revisions of this kind have been
carried out over the last few years, especially, for example, in the case
of Greece.
17  The core inflation rate is approximated here as the year-on rate of
change of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), excluding
energy, foodstuffs, alcohol, and tobacco.
Table 9
Financial Balance1 of Public Budget for the 
EMU Countries
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Germany –3.7 –4.0 –3.7 –3.5 –3.1
France –3.2 –4.2 –3.7 –3.2 –3.2
Italy –2.6 –3.1 –3.1 –3.7 –4.5
Spain –0.3 0.3 –0.3 0.1 0.1
The Netherlands –1.9 –3.2 –2.5 –2.3 –2.2
Belgium 0.1 0.4 0.1 –0.3 –0.4
Austria –0.2 –1.1 –1.3 –2.0 –1.8
Greece –4.1 –5.2 –6.1 –5.0 –4.1
Finland 4.3 2.5 2.1 1.7 1.8
Ireland –0.4 0.2 1.3 –0.8 –0.5
Portugal –2.7 –2.9 –2.9 –6.5 –5.5
Luxembourg 2.3 0.5 –1.1 –1.1 –0.9
EMU countries2 –2.4 –2.9 –2.8 –2.8 –2.8
1 As % of gross domestic product; apportionment according to Maastricht Treaty.
— 2 Total of countries listed. Weighted by 2004 GDP in euro.
Sources: Eurostat; European Commission; 2005 and 2006: Institutes' forecast.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005  387
still discernibly lower than its average for many years.
On the most recent figures, interest rates for ten-year
government bonds in the euro zone fell by over half a
percentage point to 3.2% over the same period. In real
terms, capital market interest rates remained at the his-
torically low level of 1.3%.18 Financing conditions for
enterprises have improved further in recent months.
Thus, interest rates for enterprise loans19 decreased by
Figure 6
The Monetary Situation in the EMU Countries
1 Short-term = three-month Euribor; long-term = 10-year government bonds; lending rates = enterprise loans with term of 1 to 5 years; prior to 2003: term of at least one year. —
2 M3 = circulation of notes and coins, daily deposits, deposits with an agreed duration of up to two years; deposits with agreed notice period of up to three months; repo busi-
ness, money market fund shares and papers; debt securities with maturity up to two years; Index, rates of change (%). — 3 Seasonally adjusted, annualised rate. — 4 Centered
three-month moving average. — 5 HICP = harmonized index of consumer prices; core inflation rate = rate of change of HICP, excluding energy, foods, alcohol, tobacco.
Sources: European Central Bank; Eurostat; German Bundesbank; Institutes' calculations.
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18  Long-term inflationary expectations, which are used for deflation,
are approximated here using the breakeven inflation rate of the
indexed French long-term government bonds.388 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005
half a percentage point to 4.4% and, according to the
Bank Lending Survey, the lending conditions of the
commercial banks were relaxed to a greater extent than
previously in mid-2005. In addition, the stock markets
have continued to recover over the last six months; the
EuroStoxx 50-Index rose by almost 10%. The competi-
tiveness of exporters also improved perceptibly in this
period because the euro depreciated by 3% in real effec-
tive terms; it lost almost 7% in nominal terms against
the US dollar. 
The expansion of M3 money supply accelerated sub-
stantially over the course of the last six months. The
rate of increase last amounted to 11.5% (three-month
average of the annualized change on the previous
month), and thus significantly exceeded the ECB refer-
ence value of 4.5%. The more liquid M1 aggregate actu-
ally rose at a rate of 15.8%. Open-account loans to the
private sector also expanded much more rapidly in
recent months, most recently at a rate of 10.7%; this
applies to loans both to private households and to non-
financial joint-stock companies. All in all, the monetary
parameters are favorable compared to the past.
As a result of the sharp rise in oil prices, the inflation
rate will exceed the maximum limit for price stability _
as defined by the ECB _ both this year and next year.
However, the rate will probably be only slightly off tar-
get. Thus, there is no need for the ECB to respond imme-
diately. However, the acceleration in money supply
growth, which has persisted since mid-2004, is indica-
tive of risks to price stability in the medium term.
The Institutes therefore believe that the ECB is likely
to raise base rates in the euro zone in the course of 2006
by a total of half a percentage point. Capital market
interest rates will also rise as the short-term rates
increase. The euro is expected to depreciate marginally
in real effective terms over the forecast period. All in all,
the monetary parameters will become slightly less
favorable.
Outlook
The economy in the euro zone will strengthen only
slightly up to the end of this year (cf. figure 7). The oil-
price rise of recent months will continue to curb private
demand for some time to come; accordingly, consumer
confidence has remained depressed to date. The mood in
industry has improved slightly, by contrast, not least
thanks to an increase in the volume of incoming orders.
The depreciation of the euro this year and the low long-
term interest rates will provide an additional positive
impetus. All in all, real GDP is likely to rise by 1.3% this
year.
The dampening effects of the oil-price rise will grad-
ually abate next year. Private consumption will then
expand slightly as employment continues to slowly
increase.20 Foreign trade is likely to make a positive con-
tribution to growth once again, given that the euro
zone's price competitiveness has recently improved.
Investments will also benefit as a result (cf. table 10).
All in all, GDP in the euro zone can be expected to
increase by 1.8% in 2006. The unemployment rate is
likely to decrease only marginally. Inflation will fall
slightly over the course of next year as the price of oil
remains stable. Following a rate of 2.2% this year, next
year's annual average inflation rate will amount to
2.1%.
Slower momentum in Great Britain
The expansion of the economy in Great Britain still
remains moderate following the slowdown last year.
Real GDP rose by an annualized rate of only 1.5% _ the
weakest increase since 2001. 19  Interest rates for loans of up to one million euro to non-financial
joint-stock companies with the interest rate initially fixed for one to
five years. 
Figure 7
Real GDP in the Euro Zone
Seasonally adjusted
1 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualized rate (right-hand scale). — 2 Fig-
ures: change (%) of the original values on the previous year.
Sources: Cabinet Office; Institutes' calculations; from 3rd quarter 2005 onwards:
Institutes' forecast.
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The marked slowdown was primarily a result of
modest private consumption growth. In view of only a
weak increase in property prices and a substantial
increase in the interest burden, private households were
evidently trying to reduce their burden of debt, which
had increased to around 150% of disposable income on
the most recent figures. This led to a sharp rise in the
savings ratio. But investments also grew only weakly,
despite the improved profit situation for enterprises.
On the basis of the moderate pace of economic
growth, the Bank of England provisionally reduced
interest rates by 25 basis points to 4.5%. However, at
2.4%, the inflation rate (measured in terms of the con-
sumer price index) now significantly exceeds its target
value. Given that consumer confidence has also
improved again, the central bank is likely to refrain
from further interest-rate reductions for the present. The
deficit in the public budgets will probably not be
reduced, especially because of the weak growth rate. It
is doubtful that austerity measures _ especially those
with a view to fulfilling the 'golden rule'21  _ will be
implemented next year because the planned comprehen-
sive spending review has been postponed to 2007. The
Institutes expect fiscal policy to remain slightly expan-
sive for the time being.
Under these conditions, real GDP in Great Britain is
likely to rise at a somewhat stronger pace again over the
forecast period. Given that the rise in disposable income
will not be dampened by tax increases as it was last
year, private consumption is likely to boost itself again
if the savings ratio once again rises slightly. Investment
by enterprises will probably increase at only a moderate
rate for the present because their level of indebtedness is
still very substantial compared to the past. Foreign
trade is likely to benefit increasingly from the compara-
tively low rise in unit labor costs.
All in all, the Institutes expect GDP to increase by
1.9% this year and by 2.5% next year. The unemploy-
ment rate will fall only slightly. The inflation rate is
likely to amount to 2.1% this year as a result of the high
oil price, and is likely to decrease to 1.9% in 2006.
Slightly stronger growth in the new 
member states
The pace of economic growth accelerated slightly in the
new member states of the EU in the first half of 2005,
having slowed down markedly in the second half of
2004. The slowdown was particularly conspicuous in
Poland. The current acceleration is accompanied by a
shift among the demand components. The external econ-
omy has now made a larger contribution to output
growth in almost all countries. Although the pace of
export growth slowed down slightly once the special
economic situation determined by EU entry wore off
and also as a consequence of the weaker pace of world
economic growth, import growth also diminished sub-
stantially at the same time; the balance of trade
improved in most countries. The decisive factor behind
the curtailment of imports was the weaker trend for
domestic demand _ except in Slovakia. Investments,
which grew particularly dynamically last year, have
increased only moderately since the beginning of the
year, although the growth rate has recently accelerated
to some extent. Public-sector investments expanded per-
ceptibly in some countries, not least thanks to EU subsi-
dies. Private consumption lost momentum, especially in
Poland.
The basic trend for price growth is relatively weak;
inflation rates have fallen significantly in most of the
countries. Although energy prices rose sharply in the
new member states, too, in some cases these were offset
by an appreciation of the local currency. The expiry of
the basis effect of the tax harmonization in the course of
21  Under the government's 'golden rule' strategy, the only debts
incurred during the business cycle should be those used to finance
investment. The Treasury believes the current cycle will last until
2006 (cf. HM Treasury 2005).
Table 10
EMU Countries: Key Forecast Figures
2003 2004 2005 2006
Change (%) on the previous year
Real GDP 0.7 2.1 1.3 1.8
Private consumption 1.0 1.4 1.1 1.2
Government consumption 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.7
Gross fixed capital formation 0.7 1.3 1.0 2.3
Domestic demand 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.7
Exports1 0.7 6.0 3.6 5.6
Imports1 2.7 6.1 4.2 5.5
External surplus/deficit2 –0.7 0.1 –0.2 0.2
Consumer prices3 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.1
As % of nominal GDP
Budget surplus/deficit4 –2.9 –2.8 –2.8 –2.8
Balance of payments 0.3 0.7 –0.2 0.0
As % of labor force
Unemployment rate5 8.7 8.8 8.6 8.4
1 Including intra-EMU trade. — 2 Contribution to growth. — 3 Harmonized index
of consumer prices (HICP). — 4 Total government surplus/deficit. — 5 Standard-
ized.
Sources: Eurostat; European Central Bank; Institutes' calculations; 2005 and
2006: Institutes' forecast.390 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005
EU accession has also had an impact, which is estimated
_ depending on the country _ to amount to between 1
and 2 percentage points. In Latvia and Estonia, the infla-
tion rate has not yet fallen permanently because of the
strong growth dynamic.
The pace of growth will strengthen further over the
forecast period. The average growth rate for real GDP
will be lower in 2005, however, than in 2004. Private
consumption will rise robustly, by contrast, as real
income increases. In some countries, e.g. Hungary, fiscal
policy will also provide positive impulses next year.
Investments will rise again at a stronger rate, especially
in Poland and Hungary, where monetary policy was
relaxed over the course of 2005.
Exports will rise at an accelerated rate in tandem
with the economic recovery in western Europe so that
the balances of trade are likely to improve slightly in
general. There will be little change in the inflation rate,
which will fall perceptibly only in Hungary because of
the planned reduction of value-added tax. Employment
will increase only slightly in most countries, despite the
favorable economic momentum. The unemployment
rate will decline somewhat, however, as unemployed
people increasingly withdraw from the labor market.
The question that will arise next year is whether
some of the countries fulfill the prerequisites for entry
into EMU. The second year of membership in ERM II
will come to an end in summer 2006 for Estonia, Lithua-
nia, and Slovenia. One condition for entry into the euro
zone is that the exchange rate fluctuates only compara-
tively weakly around the central parity rate during this
period. According to the present forecast, all three coun-
tries are likely to fulfill both this criterion and the other
four nominal convergence criteria; however, there is a
risk that Estonia's inflation rate will exceed the refer-
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The German Economy
Overview
The pace of economic recovery still remains very slug-
gish in Germany. After a modest beginning in mid-2003,
the upturn became bogged down again after only a year.
First export growth slowed as a result of the euro's
appreciation and the weaker pace of world economic
growth, and then German growth was curtailed by the
high energy prices. Real GDP rose by only 0.6%
between mid-2004 and mid-2005, while capacity utiliza-
tion is currently lower than a year ago.
The German economy is still characterized by imbal-
ances. It is kept alive by impulses from abroad, but
these have spread only to a limited extent to the domes-
tic economy, and the good business situation for export-
ers has not yet been reflected in higher employment at
macroeconomic level. Real domestic demand has been
more or less stagnant for the past year. The decisive fac-
tor here is the dampening effect exerted by the high
energy prices. Private consumption has remained weak
as the purchasing power of private households has
diminished. The decline in construction investments has
persisted. One bright spot on the horizon are invest-
ments in machinery and equipment, which showed a
positive trend in the first half of 2005.
The labor market situation has remained poor
against this background of sluggish growth. While the
number of employed, which had fallen momentarily, has
risen significantly again since the spring, this increase
was based exclusively on the effects of labor market pol-
icy instruments. For example, additional 'supplemen-
tary jobs' (known as 'one-euro jobs') were made avail-
able. The number of employed people subject to compul-
sory social insurance, by contrast, has remained in visi-
ble decline. At the same time, there has been a substan-
tial increase in the number of unemployed. While the
sharp rise at the beginning of the year was primarily a
consequence of the addition of social welfare recipients
who are fit for work to the unemployment register (these
were previously not registered as unemployed), even
without an adjustment for this effect unemployment
would have continued to rise in 2005.
The Institutes expect a somewhat more lively recov-
ery over the forecast period, but there is no indication
that Germany will enjoy vibrant growth. As pointed out
in the World Economy section of this forecast, the global
economy will remain healthy. The German economy is
likely to benefit in particular because it has become
more price competitive thanks to the depreciation of the
euro and, especially, thanks to the significantly
improved cost situation for enterprises. All of these fac-
tors suggest that exports will continue to expand
robustly and bolster the economy in Germany. The
sharp rise in incoming orders from abroad at the begin-
ning of the summer leads the Institutes to expect a per-
ceptible increase in the second half of the year, in partic-
ular. Exports are likely to lose some momentum over the
course of the coming year, however, as world growth
proceeds at a somewhat slower pace.
The economy will continue to receive support from
monetary policy, while fiscal policy will persist in its
efforts to reduce the structural budget deficit. Wage
growth is likely to remain only moderate, which will
tend both to strengthen Germany's competitive position
on international markets and to boost employment. On
the other hand, the rise in the price of crude oil and the
resulting price increases for other energy sources will
reduce the purchasing power of private households, so
that the prospects for real income and domestic demand
will initially remain gloomy. Real GDP is likely to rise
by an annual average 0.8% in 2005 (cf. table 11).
Domestic demand will expand to some extent next
year. Machinery investments, especially, are likely to
increase somewhat more rapidly as both sales expecta-
tions on the foreign markets and financing conditions
Box 4
Assumptions underlying the forecast
This forecast is based on the following assumptions:
–  A barrel of crude oil (Brent) will cost an average US $ 55 this year; next year the price of oil will fluctuate around the current
level of US $ 60.
–  World trade will expand by 6.5% this year and by 7% next year.
–  The dollar/euro exchange rate will amount to US $ 1.20 per euro over the forecast period. The German economy's price
competitiveness will improve slightly.
–  The European Central Bank will leave its main base rate unchanged at 2% this year and will raise it by 50 basis points over
the course of 2006. Capital market rates will rise slightly.
–  Negotiated hourly wages will increase by 1.2% on overall average this year and by 1.5% next year.
–  Given that the new German government's policy agenda is not yet available, the Institutes have only taken into consider-
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remain favorable and the profit situation of many firms
improves. However, the upturn in investment activity
will be only moderate as capacity utilization remains
low in the sectors that target the domestic market; there
will be little additional investment in these sectors. The
dampening influence of the high energy prices on pri-
vate consumption is likely to abate over the course of
2006. In addition, employment prospects will brighten
up to some extent. Consumption spending will therefore
improve slightly again over the course of the year and
bolster the economy to some extent. The somewhat
slower pace of export growth will probably be slightly
more than offset by the growth in domestic demand,
with the result that the recovery will gain ground. Real
GDP will grow by 1.2% in 2006.
This pace of expansion will not be sufficient to bring
about a radical change on the labor market. However,
the number of insured employed, at least, is likely to
increase slightly in the second half of next year _ for the
first time since the end of 2000. While unemployment
will continue to fall, the decline will be based to a large
extent on the provision of additional 'supplementary
jobs' for persons in receipt of the new Unemployment
Benefit II (ALG II). An average 4.76 million people will
be registered unemployed in 2006, compared to 4.88 mil-
lion this year.
Inflation will gradually subside over the course of
next year as prices stabilize on the international energy
markets. However, at an annual average 2.0%, con-
sumer prices will rise at much the same rate as this year.
All in all, growth in Germany still depends to a huge
extent on international stimuli. Thus, in mathematical
terms, this year's increase in real GDP corresponds more
or less to the rise in the external balance; next year the
external balance will account for two-thirds of growth.
Because the pace of domestic demand growth will not be
very strong in 2006, either, even minor external disrup-
tions could thrust the Germany economy back into a
state of near-stagnation. Thus, a further sharp rise in
energy prices would considerably impede growth in
Germany, given that it would also increase the risk of
the world economy entering into difficult waters.
Another uncertainty underlying the forecast is the
fact that it is still not easy to estimate the economic pol-
icy intentions of the new German government. This
forecast is based on the assumption of an economic pol-
icy status quo. If far-reaching reforms are agreed and
rapidly implemented, then the prospects for the medium
term will improve, and the effects might already be seen
in 2006.
Individual trends
External demand bolsters growth
Following a period of stagnation in the second half of
2004, exports have again gained significantly in momen-
tum this year. The German economy profited compared
Table 11
Key Forecast Figures for Germany
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Gross domestic product1
change (%) on the previous year 0.1 –0.2 1.6 0.8 1.2
Western Germany 0.0 –0.2 1.6 0.8 1.2
Eastern Germany2, 3 0.7 0.2 1.5 0.3 0.9
Labor force4(in 000s) 39 096 38 722 38 868 38 940 39 185
Unemployed (in 000s) 4 061 4 377 4 381 4 875 4 755
Unemployment rate5 (%) 9.4 10.2 10.1 11.2 10.9
Consumer prices6
change (%) on the previous year 1.4 1.1 1.6 2.1 2.0
Unit labor costs7
change (%) on the previous year 0.8 0.7 –0.9 –0.9 –0.2
Public sector financial balance8
Euro billion –79.6 –86.6 –81.2 –78.5 –70.5
As % of nominal GDP –3.7 –4.0 –3.7 –3.5 –3.1
Balance of payments (euro billion) 48.2 45.2 83.5 85.0 95.0
1 At previous year's prices. — 2 Including Berlin. — 3 As at August 2004/February 2005; at 1995 prices. — 4 Domestic. — 5 Unemployed as % of domestic labor force
(place of residence concept). — 6 Consumer price index (2000 = 100). — 7 Compensation of employees per employee created in the domestic economy as % of GDP at
previous year's prices per member of labor force. — 8 On national accounting definitions (ESNA 95); the calculation takes account of 'reduced expenditure' resulting from
the sale of asset-backed securities from the Postal Workers' Pension Fund.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; Federal Labour Office; Federal States' Working Group on ESNA; German Bundesbank; 2005 and 2006: Institutes' forecast.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005  393
Revision of the spring 2005 forecast
This forecast is not entirely comparable with the spring fore-
cast. In spring, the Institutes had reported the trend for real
GDP in terms of the prices of a fixed base year. On April 28,
2005, the Federal Statistical Office switched to a new proce-
dure and began presenting real GDP in reference to a yearly
changing price basis (cf. box 6). This adjustment was
accompanied by other conceptual innovations such as
increased use of hedonic price indices and a new booking
procedure for indirectly measured services provided by
financial intermediaries (FISIM). Compared to the data pro-
vided in the past by the Federal Statistical Office, these
changes have increased the growth rate for real GDP
between 1991 and 2004 by an average 0.2 percentage
points (1.5% against 1.3%); the rates of change for the indi-
vidual years are up to 0.4 percentage points higher than the
values reported to date.1 The rates of change for the quar-
terly values of real GDP – both compared to the previous
year and compared to the previous quarter – are also gener-
ally higher than those calculated prior to the adjustment.
However, the overall economic picture has not changed sub-
stantially.
According to the current estimate, the moderate rise in mac-
roeconomic output forecast in spring 2005 is still likely to
materialize. In the spring forecast, a real growth rate of 0.7%
was predicted for this year. Now the increase in GDP is esti-
mated at 0.8% (cf. table 12). Exports are expanding at a
somewhat more dynamic pace than expected because the
euro has depreciated further against the US dollar. At the
same time, the growth rate for imports will be weaker; the
change in the external balance will now contribute 0.9 per-
centage points to output growth (spring forecast: +0.4 per-
centage points). The trend for domestic demand, by con-
trast, will be less favorable than forecast in the spring; this is
now actually expected to make a negative contribution to
growth (–0.1 percentage points; spring forecast: +0.3 per-
centage points). The decline in construction investments will
be more substantial than expected. According to the new
forecast, private consumption will decrease as a conse-
quence of the renewed oil-price rise.
1  Cf. A. Braakmann et al.: 'Revision der Volkswirtschaftlichen
Gesamtrechnungen 2005 für den Zeitraum 1991 bis 2004.' In:
Wirtschaft und Statistik, 5/2005, p. 426.
Table 12
Forecast and Deviations from Forecast for 2005
Real GDP expenditure
Spring report Autumn report
Deviations from 
forecast for 2005
Estimated figures for 20051 Estimated figures for 20052
Change (%) 












contributions to growth 
in percentage points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3) minus (1) (4) minus (2)
Domestic demand 0.4 0.3 –0.1 –0.1 –0.5 –0.4
Private consumption 0.4 0.2 –0.5 –0.3 –0.9 –0.5
Government consumption –0.1 0.0 –0.8 –0.2 –0.7 –0.2
Machinery and other equipment 3.8 0.3 3.8 0.3 0.0 0.0
Construction –2.2 –0.2 –4.9 –0.5 –2.7 –0.3
Change in stocks – 0.0 – 0.5 – 0.5
External balance – 0.4 – 0.9 – 0.5
Exports 4.1 1.7 5.9 2.2 1.8 0.5
Imports 3.8 –1.3 4.2 –1.4 0.4 –0.1
Gross domestic product 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.1
Memo item:
GDP USA 3.5 – 3.6 – – –
GDP EMU countries 1.4 – 1.3 – – –
World trade 7.0 – 6.5 – – –
Consumer price index 1.7 – 2.1 – – –
1 At 1995 prices. — 2 At previous year's prices. — 3 Contributions of demand components to change in GDP (Lundberg components). A demand component's con-
tribution to growth is given by the growth rate weighted with the aggregate as a share of the previous year's GDP (spring forecast: real share, autumn forecast: nom-
inal share). Figures may not sum due to rounding. GDP: change (%) on the previous year.
Sources: Institutes' calculations.
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to the rest of the euro zone _ the destination for almost
half of all German exports _ from the ongoing improve-
ment in its competitiveness as a consequence of the rela-
tively low increase in prices and costs; exports to the euro zone expanded again perceptibly. Exports to the
new EU member states have increased again since fall
of last year. There was a very substantial increase in
sales to the OPEC countries, where demand has risen
considerably as a result of the sharp growth in revenue
from oil sales. Exports to the USA, which had been in
slight decline until well into the second half of 2004 _ in
large part because of the euro's appreciation _ expanded
again moderately in the first half of this year. Sales to
Asia (and especially to China) fell, by contrast, having
previously risen at an unusually brisk pace.
Given that the world economy will grow robustly
over the forecast period and that investments, in partic-
ular, will increase significantly, substantial demand
shocks can be expected from abroad. Moreover, follow-
ing its peak period in the winter of 2004/2005, the euro
has now depreciated again substantially, so that Ger-
many's price competitiveness has also improved com-
pared to the dollar zone. The rise in costs and prices has
remained low in Germany compared to other countries,
and this will strengthen the German economy's competi-
tiveness in the euro zone. All of this suggests that
exports will rise again substantially over the forecast
period, even if the pace of export growth will gradually
slow as a result of the slightly more relaxed pace of
world growth. All in all, real exports are likely to
increase by 5.9% this year and by 6.5% next year. They
Table 13
Foreign Trade Indicators1
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Change (%) on the previous year
Real exports2 6.4 4.2 2.4 9.3 5.9 6.5
Goods 6.3 3.5 3.0 10.0 6.2 6.6
Services 7.6 9.1 –1.2 5.1 3.7 5.7
Real imports2 1.2 –1.4 5.1 7.0 4.2 5.1
Goods 0.3 –0.3 6.6 8.2 5.3 5.6
Services 4.7 –4.9 –0.1 2.7 0.1 3.2




net exports 42.5 97.1 87.6 109.5 117.7 127.1
Balance of 
payments3 3.3 48.2 45.2 83.5 90.0 100.0
1 On national accounting definitions (ESNA 95). — 2 At previous year's prices. —
3 On balance of payments statistics definitions.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; German Bundesbank; Institutes' calculations;
2005 and 2006: Institutes' forecast.
Figure 8
Real Exports
Adjusted for seasonal fluctuations and working days
1 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualized rate (right-hand scale). — 2 Fig-
ures: change (%) of the original values on the previous year.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; Institutes' calculations; from 3rd quarter 2005
onwards: Institutes' forecast.
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Adjusted for seasonal fluctuations and working days
1 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualized rate (right-hand scale). — 2 Fig-
ures: change (%) of the original values on the previous year.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; Institutes' calculations; from 3rd quarter 2005
onwards: Institutes' forecast.
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Figure 10
German Exports by Country and Region
Special trade; seasonally adjusted quarterly values in billion euro
1 Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Cyprus. — 2 Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; Institutes' calculations.
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will thus remain the linchpin of economic growth in Ger-
many.
Imports rose again in the spring, following a brief
period of weakness at the beginning of the year. Given
the high import content of exports, imports are also indi-
rectly boosted by the lively demand from abroad. The
conspicuous increase in imports of investment goods
reflects the fact that propensity to invest has consoli-
dated in Germany. Demand for foreign consumer goods
has increased slightly over the course of this year,
despite the persisting weakness of private consumption.
In particular, imports of low-priced consumer goods
from Asia and the new EU member states are likely to
have increased. Imports of energy sources also increased
perceptibly, in terms of volume, despite the sharp price
increases. Clearly, stocks have been built up in expecta-
tion of a further rise in prices.
As exports continue to rise rapidly and investment
activity livens up in Germany, imports will also con-
tinue to expand significantly. Consumer demand is also
likely to increase slightly next year, so that some stimu-
lation will be received from this corner, too. Imports will
grow by 4.2% this year and by 5.1% in 2006.
Under these conditions, the external balance will
continue to rise both this year and next year. All in all,
the external economy alone will contribute 0.9 percent-
age points this year to real GDP growth and 0.8 percent-
age points next year.
Export prices have risen again since the spring. The
scope for price increases has evidently tended to
increase in recent months in consequence of the ongoing
upturn in the world economy and the depreciation of the
euro; as a result, producers have been able to at least
partly pass on the cost increases created by the rise in
prices for energy sources and industrial commodities.
This was facilitated by the fact that their competitors in
other countries were also affected by the price increases
on the industrial commodity markets. In view of the stiff
international competition and only moderate wage
growth in Germany, it can be expected, however, that
the rise in export prices will remain modest over the
forecast period.
The increase in import prices accelerated apprecia-
bly this year. The decisive factor was the continued
robust increase in prices for energy sources and other
commodities, which was further strengthened in recent
months by the euro's depreciation. This forecast is
based on the assumption that the price of oil will
amount to around US $ 60 per barrel and that the euro's
exchange rate will remain more or less at its current
level. Under these conditions, the increase in import
prices will weaken considerably next year. The terms of
trade will deteriorate by 1.5% this year, and by 1.3%
next year.
Growth in machinery investments
Machinery investments have moved onto an upward
trajectory again since spring 2004. The primary reason
has been the improvement in sales and profitability
prospects abroad. As a result, investments are now
being made in particular in the export-oriented sectors
of industry, where capacity utilization is also rising per-
ceptibly. Investment is being stimulated in general by
the favorable financing conditions _ for example, by the
further reduction in interest rates on the capital market.
In addition, enterprises have substantially increased
their profit margins by considerably reducing their per-
sonnel costs, primarily by means of lengthier working
Table 14
German Exports by Region
Nominal exports (special trade)
Country group
2003 2004 2005
Euro billion Share (%) % of GDP1 Euro billion Share (%) % of GDP1 Euro billion Share (%) % of GDP1
EU-25 423.6 63.8 19.6 468.6 63.9 21.1 246.1 64.4 22.4
of which: euro zone 288.7 43.4 13.3 319.0 43.5 14.4 169.1 44.2 15.4
new EU countries2 56.5 8.5 2.6 61.4 8.4 2.8 31.8 8.3 2.9
NAFTA3 71.4 10.7 3.3 74.6 10.2 3.4 38.5 10.1 3.5
East Asia4 54.6 8.2 2.5 60.5 8.2 2.7 29.3 7.7 2.7
of which: China 18.3 2.7 0.8 21.0 2.9 0.9 9.5 2.5 0.9
Others 114.9 17.3 5.3 129.8 17.7 5.9 68.3 17.9 6.2
Total 664.5 100.0 30.7 733.5 100.0 33.1 382.3 100.0 34.7
1 As % of nominal GDP. — 2 Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slowenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Cyprus. — 3 USA, Canada, Mexico. — 4 Japan, China,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; Institutes' calculations.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005  397
hours and the abolition of non-tariff benefits. Capacity
utilization is still low in the sectors that target the
domestic market. Thus, the rise in machinery invest-
ments in the first half of the year remained moderate
overall.
The results of surveys22 and the upward trend in
domestic incoming orders for producers of investment
goods lead the Institutes to expect a more vigorous
expansion of investments in the second half of the year.
This is also indicated by the volume of large-scale
orders recently received. A slight increase in the pace of
investment growth can be expected next year. However,
the momentum will remain moderate compared to previ-
ous phases of recovery as oil prices remain high and
therefore dampen growth, while the domestic forces for
growth will remain weak. However, the robust growth
in external demand will encourage those firms that are
directly or indirectly dependent on exports to expand
their production capacities. All in all, machinery invest-
ments will increase by 4.5% in 2006, following a rise of
4.1% this year. Investments in other equipment will
increase by an annual average 2.1% in 2005 and by
4.0% in 2006.
Continued decline in construction demand
Construction investments are still in a slump. Residen-
tial construction, in particular, is continuing to decline,
despite low mortgage interest rates. The dampening
effects resulting from job uncertainty and the weak
growth of real incomes will persist this year, too. The
additional demand created by the debate concerning the
abolition of the subsidy for owner-occupied housing con-
struction has probably been largely absorbed, and the
absence of orders brought forward in order to avail of
the subsidy will now be felt. In some regions, the sur-
plus of housing will also curb demand. Next year, the
pace of the downward trend will slow down slightly.
Prospects on the labor market will brighten to some
extent, and in some specific regions, construction of
apartment blocks is likely to become profitable again for
commercial investors.
In the commercial construction sector, the moderate
pace of economic recovery as well as the high surplus
capacity of office property suggest that there is little
hope of reversing the downward trend. Investments in
commercial construction are therefore likely to diminish
substantially this year. The gradual stabilization of
property rents and the recovery in machinery invest-
ments suggest that the downward trend in commercial
construction will slow down next year.
Public-sector investment in construction will fall
again over the course of this year because of the difficult
budget situation. Next year, however, the municipalities
_ the main public-sector investors _ are likely to invest
22  Cf. J. Gürtler and A. Städtler: 'Dynamisches Wachstum in der Lea-
singbranche  _ die Anzeichen für eine Belebung der Investitions-
tätigkeit mehren sich.' In: ifo Schnelldienst, vol. 58, no. 17, 2005, pp. 21-
24; A. Weichselberger: 'Westdeutsche Industrie plant nach drei Jahren
rückläufiger Investitionen für 2005 einen Anstieg.' In: ifo Schnelldienst,
vol. 58, no. 17, 2005, pp. 25-31.
Figure 11
Real Investment
in Machinery and Other Equipment
1 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualized rate (right-hand scale). — 2 Fig-
ures: change (%) of the original values on the previous year.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; Institutes' calculations; from 3rd quarter 2005
onwards: Institutes' forecast.























Chain-linked volume data in euro billion
Table 15
Real Investment in Construction1
2004 2003 2004 2005 2006
% 
Share
Change (%) on the previous year
Residential buildings 58.1 –1.0 –1.6 –5.0 –2.1
Nonresidential buildings 41.9 –2.4 –3.4 –4.6 –0.1
Commercial construction 30.4 –0.6 –1.0 –5.2 –1.0
Public-sector construction 11.5 –6.5 –9.1 –3.0 2.3
Investment in construction 100.0 –1.6 –2.3 –4.9 –1.2
1 At previous year's prices.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; Institutes' calculations; 2005 and 2006: Insti-
tutes' forecast.398 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005
more as their revenue from business tax increases.
Moreover, the federal government's rising income from
the highway toll for goods vehicles is likely to boost
public-sector investment to some extent. However, this
revenue will probably not be entirely utilized for addi-
tional investments in view of the enduring pressure to
consolidate the budgets. All in all, construction invest-
ments will decrease by 4.9% in 2005 and by 1.2% the
following year.
Private consumption still Germany's problem child
Germany has still not managed to remedy the lull in
consumption that has persisted since 2002. Consumer
spending actually declined again in real terms in the
first half of this year. Although further tax cuts entered
into force at the beginning of the year, disposable
income failed to increase because of weak employment
growth and a decline in social transfers. In real terms,
disposable income actually declined, in particular as a
consequence of the sharp rise in energy and fuel prices.
The savings ratio remained high in view of uncertain
income and employment prospects.
A sustained recovery of private consumption is not
to be expected over the forecast period. The high level of
job uncertainty and the gloomy income prospects are
continuing to curtail consumption, and gross earnings
are practically stagnant. In addition, employees have
been paying an additional contribution to statutory
health insurance since mid-2005. Moreover, the high
energy prices are substantially reducing purchasing
power. Private consumption is likely to fall by 0.5% in
real terms on annual average in 2005 (cf. figure 13).
Gross wages and salaries will rise to some extent in
2006 as the volume of employment begins to expand
again. However, actual wages will rise more slowly than
negotiated wages, as has already been the case in previ-
ous years. The abolition of non-tariff wage components
will continue. There will be little growth in net wages
because of the system of progressive tax rates. Mone-
tary social benefits will increase only marginally. Old-
age pensions will not be raised mid-year for the third
time running. Income from self-employment and assets
will expand again at a considerable pace, however. This
will be partly due to the improved economic situation
and to the increase in dividend payments. The dispos-
able income of private households will rise at a sharper
rate  _ 1.4% _ than this year. The savings ratio will
remain constant at 10.6%. Although employment pros-
pects will brighten up, private households are likely to
increase their savings for old age. All in all, real private
consumption will increase only marginally over the
Figure 12
Real Investment in Construction
Adjusted for seasonal fluctuations and working days
1 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualized rate (right-hand scale). — 2 Fig-
ures: change (%) of the original values on the previous year.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; Institutes' calculations; from 3rd quarter 2005
onwards: Institutes' forecast.

























Chain-linked volume data in euro billion
Figure 13
Real Private Consumer Spending1
Adjusted for seasonal fluctuations and working days
1 Including private non-profit organizations. — 2 Change (%) on the previous quarter,
annualized rate (right-hand scale). — 3 Figures: change (%) of the original values on
the previous year.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; Institutes' calculations; from 3rd quarter 2005
onwards: Institutes' forecast.
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course of 2006. Because of its low level at the beginning
of the year, the annual average trend for real private
consumption will actually be a decline of 0.2%.
Oil inflation drives prices upwards
Following sharp price increases for crude oil and other
commodities, the acceleration in prices at the consumer
level intensified. The inflation rate reached its highest
level in over four years when it rose to 2.5% in Septem-
ber. The price rise was partly based on a further
increase in tobacco tax (1.2 cent per cigarette). The core
inflation rate (consumer prices, excluding energy prices
and the increase in tobacco tax) amounted to 1.25% in
September. However, the inflation of crude oil and other
commodities, which has already persisted for some time,
will increasingly be passed on to downstream produc-
tion phases. Thus, the core rate will also increase.
All in all, however, this forecast is not based on the
expectation of a sustained deterioration in the price cli-
mate. On the one hand, the ongoing weak level of con-
sumer demand and the intensive competition in retail
trade are unlikely to permit higher price increases; on
the other, the high level of unemployment will have a
dampening effect on wage growth and thus also on
labor costs. However, gas prices, electricity prices, and
charges for district heating, which are all aligned with
the trend for oil prices, will rise significantly. The infla-
tion rate will amount to around 2% on average this year.
The rather substantial overhang (1.5%) and the fact that
the energy-price rises will be passed on for some time to
come suggest that next year's inflation rate will be of a
similar magnitude.
Lethargic output growth 
The trend for macroeconomic activity has been very
irregular since the low point reached in 2003.23 While
GDP rose robustly at the beginning of this year, it stag-
Chain-linked volume measures
The Federal Statistical Office and the Institutes have always
expressed the trend for real GDP in constant prices with
respect to a base year (fixed price basis). Real GDP in year t
was given by the sum of i (i = 1, …, n) quantities q(i,t) at the
prices p(i,0) of a base year 0:
GDP(t) = Σi(i,t) p(i,0)
The base year (the last used was 1995) was usually
updated every five years in order to take account of changes
in relative prices. On April 28, 2005, the Federal Statistical
Office published the results of a comprehensive revision of
the National Accounts. Real GDP is now expressed in terms
of an annually changing price basis (preceding year price
basis). The mathematical procedure is to first calculate rela-
tives for the annual results at constant prices based on the
previous year. By chain-linking the annual changes in vol-
ume, time series can be calculated for the volume trends.
Real GDP is expressed in terms of a chain index where the
reference year 2000 = 100.
In this forecast, in order to be able to continue to express the
magnitudes of real aggregates, the Institutes instead of
chain indices present so-called chain-linked volume mea-
sures in billion euros (cf. Key National Accounts Data,
p. 416). These are obtained by multiplying the accumulated
annual changes in volume by nominal GDP in the reference
year [ = Σiq(i,0) p(i,0)]:
GDP(t) = Πk=1,...,t∆ GDP (k,k-1) ×Σ iq(i,0) p(i,0)
by ∆ GDP(k,k-1) = Σiq(i,k) p(i,k-1)/Σiq(i,k-1)p(i,k-1) 
(= annual change in volume)
The switch to the method of the preceding year price basis
means that there is no longer any need to correct the growth
rates of real aggregates, as was generally necessary each
time the base year was changed in the past. One disadvan-
tage of the new system is the fact that the chain-linked vol-
ume measures are not additive. In other words, the sum of
the real GDP components generally does not produce the
value of real GDP, rather a residual emerges (i.e., the differ-
ence between the directly calculated chain-linked GDP and
the sum of the chain-linked GDP components). Between
1991 and 2004, this residual amounted to a maximum 0.4%
of real GDP. The residuals are generally all the larger the
longer the distance between the reporting interval and the
reference year. They are zero only in the reference year and
the following year. The only way to express balances such
as the external balance or the change in stocks in real terms
is to use the GDP growth components (cf. table 17).
Various procedures are available for constructing price-
adjusted aggregates for the quarterly calculations; the Fed-
eral Statistical Office has chosen the 'annual overlap'
method. The advantage of this procedure is that the sum of
the quarterly results corresponds to the respective annual
result (time additivity).1
1  Cf. W. Nierhaus: 'Vorjahrespreisbasis und Chain-Linking in den
VGR: Das Wichtigste der neuen Volumenrechnung.' In: ifo Schnell-
dienst, vol. 58, no. 15, 2005, pp. 29-35.
Box 6
23  The fluctuations from one quarter to the next are possibly exagger-
ated because inadequate consideration is given to the working-day
effect.400 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005
nated in the second quarter. Overall, it rose at an annual-
ized rate of 1.5% in the first half of 2005. Macroeco-
nomic output was boosted by external demand, in par-
ticular, while investment in machinery and stocks also
provided stimulation. Industrial output, which rose con-
siderably, profited in particular from this trend. Output
in the tertiary sector increased only slightly, while value
added actually fell in consumer-related services. The
decline in the construction sector persisted.
A continued increase in macroeconomic output looks
likely for the second half of the year. This is indicated
by the lively trend for orders in manufacturing industry;
in particular, orders from abroad have risen dynami-
cally. The acceleration in the pace of growth will be
slight, however, because the domestic forces for growth
have been weakened by the oil-price thrust, 
All in all, the Institutes expect GDP to rise by 0.8%
in 2005. After adjusting for working days the increase
will amount to 1.0% (cf. table 17, figure 14). 
Macroeconomic output will rise at a slightly swifter
pace in 2006. In addition to external demand, domestic
demand will then also contribute to the increase. How-
ever, strong momentum is still not to be expected
because the price of oil will remain high and the effect of
this year's price thrust will persist. Industrial output
will continue to grow. In addition, the decline in the con-
struction sector will slow. All in all, GDP can be
expected to rise by 1.2%; the increase will amount to
1.4% following adjustment for the working-day effect.
In eastern Germany, in the first half of this year GDP
fell slightly below the level reached in the first half of
Energy import bill
The price increases on the international energy markets are
a significant burden for the German economy. A first indica-
tion of the size of the burden can be gleaned from the
energy import bill, which summarizes German imports of
crude oil, natural gas, fuel, and other energy sources. In the
interests of simplification, it was assumed in the following
calculations that the volume of imports will remain identical
in 2005 and 2006. Thus, changes in consumption habits are
not taken into account.
Under the assumptions made in this forecast regarding the
oil price, Germany will have to spend an additional 20 billion
euro this year for energy imports; this corresponds to almost
1% of nominal GDP. Next year the import bill will be another
16 billion euro higher; at almost 0.75% of GDP, the increase
in expenditure will be only slightly weaker than this year. The
specific origins of the burden will also shift to an extent: This
year, the effect of the increase in the price of oil will be stron-
ger; next year the burden will originate to a greater extent
from the other energy sources, especially natural gas,
whose prices often adjust to the change in the price of oil
only following a certain time lag.
The impact of the price increases for energy sources will
therefore be significant. However, this had already been
given ample consideration in the previous forecasts; for
example, in the spring forecast, the Institutes had expected
an average oil price of around 50 U.S. dollars per barrel both
this year and next year. Thus, the increase in the price of oil
since then and the resulting correction of the estimation of
its further development this year only results in a slight
increase in the energy import bill compared to the spring.
Next year, however, will bring an additional burden of around
0.5% of nominal GDP.
These effects correspond to the maximum possible impact,
not least because energy savings are not taken into
account. Other factors left unconsidered in the calculations
are the increase in earnings from exports of mineral-oil prod-
ucts induced by the higher prices, and the fact that cost
increases in exports – again induced by the higher energy
prices – will be passed on to buyers, so that some of the bur-




Adjusted for seasonal fluctuations and working days
1 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualized rate (right-hand scale). — 2 Fig-
ures: change (%) of the original values on the previous year.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; Institutes' calculations; from 3rd quarter 2005
onwards: Institutes' forecast.
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2004, while it rose by 0.8% in western Germany. The
main factor behind the persistence of the weak phase in
eastern Germany was the fact that its industry is not
particularly export oriented. Thus, output growth did
not benefit greatly from the very strong external
impulses. In addition, the decline in construction activ-
ity, measured in terms of turnover in the construction
industry, was twice as strong as in western Germany.
In recent months, both incoming orders and turnover
in industry have risen very robustly in eastern Ger-
many, too, and indicators suggest that the decline in the
construction sector will be much weaker than before.
Consequently, a significant increase in macroeconomic
output can be expected again in the second half of the
year, primarily as a consequence of sharp increases in
industrial production. Value added in enterprise-related
services and in the transport sector is likely to rise on
the basis of this resulting impetus. However, because of
the lull in the first half of the year, there will be only a
marginal increase in GDP for 2005 as a whole. Next
year, growth will also accelerate in eastern Germany,
though to a weaker extent than in the west because Ger-




2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Crude oil
Billion euro 23.83 21.37 20.04 20.22 24.42 35.63 40.66
Million metric tons 105.14 104.63 104.73 106.36 110.14 110.14 110.14
Change (%) on previous year 1.4 –0.5 0.1 1.6 3.6 0.0 0.0
Average price in euro per metric ton 226.6 204.2 191.4 190.1 221.8 323.5 369.2
Change (%) on previous year 86.7 –9.9 –6.3 –0.6 16.6 45.9 14.1
IEA import price in US dollars per barrel 28.0 23.5 24.1 28.4 36.4 51.8 60.0
Change (%) on previous year 62.1 –15.9 2.4 17.7 28.0 42.6 15.8
Euro/US $ exchange rate 0.92 0.90 0.94 1.13 1.24 1.25 1.20
Natural gas
Billion euro 8.43 11.44 9.92 10.84 11.15 15.18 20.60
Million terajoules (TJ) 2.84 2.95 3.06 3.19 3.39 3.39 3.39
Change (%) on previous year –0.8 3.9 3.8 4.0 6.4 0.0 0.0
Average price in euro per TJ 2 967.4 3 875.0 3 238.0 3 401.0 3 288.0 4 477.2 6 078.3
Change (%) on previous year 0.0 30.6 –16.4 5.0 –3.3 36.2 35.8
Mineral-oil products, coal, coke, etc. 
in billion euro 12.4 10.7 14.0 16.9 17.5 22.4 28.3
Total energy imports in billion euro 44.63 43.46 43.99 47.93 53.08 73.25 89.56
Year-on change
Billion euro 21.14 –1.17 0.53 3.94 5.15 20.17 16.31
As % of nominal GDP 1.0 –0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.7
1 The energy bill illustrates the additional burden resulting for Germany from the increase in the price of imported energy sources. It is assumed that the same quantities of
energy will be imported in 2005 and 2006.
Sources: BAFA; MVW; BMVW; Federal Statistical Office; Institutes' calculations; 2005 and 2006: Institutes' forecast.
Table 17
Contribution of Demand Components
to Increase in GDP1
In percentage points
2004 2005 2006
Consumer spending 0.0 –0.4 –0.1
Private households2 0.3 –0.3 –0.1
Government –0.3 –0.2 0.0
Fixed capital formation 0.0 –0.2 0.2
Machinery 0.2 0.3 0.3
Construction –0.2 –0.5 –0.1
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0
Change in stocks 0.5 0.5 0.2
Domestic demand 0.5 –0.1 0.3
External surplus/deficit 1.1 0.9 0.8
Exports 3.3 2.2 2.6
Imports –2.2 –1.4 –1.8
GDP3 1.6 0.8 1.2
1 Cf. table 12 for definition. At previous year's prices; figures may not sum due to
rounding. — 2 Including private non-profit organizations. — 3 Change (%) on the
previous year.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; 2005 and 2006: Institutes' forecast.402 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005
Little immediate improvement on the labor market
The situation on the labor market has continued to dete-
riorate against the background of weak growth. This is
demonstrated not least by the ongoing downward trend
in the number of employees subject to mandatory social
insurance. Since the spring, this trend has at best only
flattened out to some extent; in mid-2005, the figure was
still around 400 000 lower than a year previously. How-
ever, this development is also a consequence of the abo-
lition of some traditional labor market policy instru-
ments _ especially job-creation measures. The reform of
labor market policy has had very discernible effects for
the remainder of the labor force. The number of 'mini-
jobs,' which had continued to rise steadily last year, fell
in the first quarter of 2005, but subsequently increased
again slightly. The basic trend for the number of 'Ich-
AG' small businesses, which had soared again at the
beginning of the year following the entry into force of
Hartz IV, has since been in decline. On the one hand, the
number of newly approved grants is likely to have
decreased as the qualifying conditions were tightened
up (evidence is now required of a viable business con-
cept). On the other hand, more businesses closed down
as an increasing number of founders moved into the sec-
ond or third year of the program and therefore received
much lower subsides, which in many cases did not suf-
fice to cover the required social insurance contributions.
The total number of employed declined in the first
quarter, but subsequently rose again.24 However, the
increase is mainly a consequence of the increased provi-
sion of non-profit job opportunities ('supplementary
jobs') for recipients of ALG II. Their number increased
by 90 000 between March and June. The sharp expan-
sion of these 'one-euro jobs' is problematic because there
is a growing number of signals that such employment
relationships are displacing regular employment.25
Without taking 'minijobs,' 'Ich-AG' businesses, and
'supplementary jobs' into consideration, the number of
employed has been in visible decline to date. The per-
ceptible increase in the number of vacancies this year is
also a consequence of the growing supply of 'supple-
mentary jobs.'
The number of unemployed soared by around
550 000 in the first three months of the year because,
since the implementation of the Hartz IV labor market
reforms, social welfare recipients who are fit for work
but were previously not registered as unemployed are
now included in the unemployment statistics.26 The sea-
sonal decline in the number of unemployed that can be
observed since April can be partly explained by the fact
that people who were not entitled to ALG II withdrew
their claim or did not update it, or proved on closer
inspection to be unfit for work and were therefore
removed from the register. However, what had a much
greater effect was the fact that an increasing number of
long-term unemployed were employed in 'supplemen-
tary jobs.'
There is no reason to expect a radical improvement
on the labor market. The number of insured employed
will first continue to decline, albeit at a slower rate than
up to now. This number will reach its lowest point over
the course of the coming year as the economic recovery
progresses, and will then rise slightly in the second half
of the year. The total number of employed will remain
on a positive trajectory this year, albeit primarily
because of the expansion of 'supplementary jobs.' A
slightly more robust increase in employment can be
expected next year, in part because the number of 'mini-
jobs' will continue to grow. However, this growth will be
offset by the fact that, under the current legislation, the
aid provided by means of 'Ich-AG' businesses will
expire at the end of this year. In addition, against the
background of the debate concerning displacement
effects, it can be expected that the expansion of 'one-
euro jobs' will come to a halt. All in all, the number of
domestic employed will have increased by 40 000 this
year compared to last year. An increase of 210 000 can
be expected in 2006. This figure is based on the assump-
tion that the number of non-profit employment opportu-
nities will increase by 205 000 in 2005 and by 133 000 in
2006.
The number of unemployed is also likely to decline
over the further course of this year, especially because
additional 'supplementary jobs' will be provided for
recipients of ALG II. At an average 4.88 million this
year, however, the number will still be around 500 000
higher than last year. Next year the number of unem-
ployed will be reduced by the economic recovery, by the
provision of additional job opportunities, by more inten-
sive placement activities on the part of the Job Centers,
24  The number of employed has been subject to frequent statistical
revisions in recent years, which has led sometimes to marked changes
in the overall trend. Thus, statistical data first showed a significant
increase in employment until well into this year. According to the
most recent revision in August, however, the initial months of 2005
will show a conspicuous decline.
25  For example, the displacement is also indicated by the increasing
number of lawsuits in which employees paid on a one-euro-job basis
have sued for the full tariff wage for activities that cannot be consid-
ered supplementary jobs. Cf. 'Langzeitarbeitslose in Ein-Euro-Jobs
klagen Tariflöhne ein.' In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of August
16, 2005, p. 11.
26  This figure also includes the approximately 70 000 social welfare
recipients in the municipalities that chose the 'optional solution'
(whereby the local authority assumes full responsibility for ALG II)
who did not appear on the unemployment register until September.
This was the main factor behind the sharp rise in the number of regis-
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Table 18
Labor Market Data
Annual averages in 000s
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Germany
Employment (domestic concept) 38 642 38 265 38 396 38 681 39 017
Employees 34 545 34 096 34 089 34 254 34 496
Employment (national concept) 39 209 38 994 38 632 38 782 38 821 39 031
Employees 35 226 34 991 34 560 34 564 34 453 34 625
of which:
Insured employed 27 901 27 629 27 007 26 561 26 171 26 094
Exclusively marginally employed 4 112 4 148 4 322 4 742 4 808 4 928
Supplementary jobs 12 217 350
Self-employed 3 983 4 003 4 072 4 218 4 368 4 406
of which: Ich-AG
Net commuters 107 102 90 86 120 155
Employment (domestic concept) 39 316 39 096 38 722 38 868 38 940 39 185
Unemployed 3 853 4 061 4 377 4 381 4 8756 4 755
Unemployment rate1 8.9 9.4 10.2 10.1 11.26 10.9
Unemployed (ILO)2 2 900 3 229 3 703 3 931 3 955 3 800
Unemployment rate (ILO)3 6.9 7.6 8.7 9.2 9.2 8.9
Active labor market policy
Short-time working 123 207 195 151 120 95
Job-creation schemes 236 194 145 119 58 50
Full-time further vocational training 352 340 260 184 110 110
West Germany4
Employment (domestic concept)5 31 433 31 337 31 059 31 192 31 226 31 421
Unemployed 2 321 2 498 2 753 2 783 3 2576 3 230
Unemployment rate1 6.9 7.4 8.1 8.2 9.56 9.3
Active labor market policy
Short-time working 94 162 160 122 94 71
Job-creation schemes 57 46 32 24 13 10
Full-time further vocational training 202 198 161 121 75 75
East Germany4
Employment (domestic concept)5 7 776 7 657 7 573 7 590 7 595 7 610
Unemployed 1 532 1 563 1 624 1 598 1 6186 1 525
Unemployment rate1 16.5 17 17.7 17.4 17.66 16.7
Active labor market policy
S h o r t - t i m e  w o r k i n g 2 94 53 52 92 62 4
Job-creation schemes 179 148 113 95 45 40
Full-time further vocational training 150 142 99 63 35 35
1 Unemployed (national concept) as % of domestic labor force (employed plus unemployed).— 2 ILO definition. — 3 Unemployed (ILO definition) as % of domestic labor force
(employed plus unemployed). — 4 Western Germany: former west Germany excluding Berlin; eastern Germany: former east Germany including Berlin. — 5 Institutes' esti-
mate based on the results for the individual Länder of the 'Labor Force Estimations' of February/March 2005. — 6 Including all unemployed in the municipalities that chose
under the 'optional solution' to assume full responsibility for Unemployment Benefit II.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; Federal Labour Office; joint federal and state government working group 'Labour Force Estimations' (data from February/March 2005);
2005 and 2006: Institutes' forecast.404 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005
and by closer check-ups on suspected abusive receipt of
ALG II. But this effect will be counteracted by the
expiry of the regulation under Section 428 of the Social
Code27  _ a kind of early retirement provision _ which
will increase the number of unemployed. Consequently,
only a slight decline in unemployment to 4.76 million
can be expected in 2006.
Slow decline in budget deficit
No progress will be made in consolidating the public
budgets in 2005. The budget deficit will decrease from
81 billion euro to 78 billion euro, that is, from 3.7% to
3.5% as a share of nominal GDP (cf. table 19). Positive
budgetary effects induced by special factors28 will be
offset by cyclical burdens and by income reductions
caused by changes in fiscal legislation.
Tax revenue is likely to increase by 0.5% this year.
The trend for VAT will be weak because growth will be
based on exports. The decline in consumption due to the
oil price will lead to revenue losses from mineral-oil tax.
On the other hand, the increase in profits will drive up
corporation and business tax. Revenue from contribu-
tions to social insurance is likely to stagnate. The num-
ber of insured employed will fall further, and income
growth will be marginal. The total burden of contribu-
tions will not change. While the contribution to nursing-
care insurance was raised for childless individuals at the
beginning of the year, health insurance contribution
rates were slightly reduced. The pension insurance sys-
tem will close its funding gap by falling back on contin-
gency reserves. All in all, government income is likely to
increase by 0.6% and therefore at a much weaker rate
than nominal GDP. The introduction of the highway toll
for goods vehicles will also have a positive effect on rev-
enue. 
The rise in spending will be very limited this year
(0.3%). Wages and salaries in the public service will
decline again; there will be further personnel reductions
and wage growth will be only marginal. By contrast,
social benefits in kind will increase perceptibly because
the reduction in the rate of increase caused by the imple-
mentation in 2004 of the statutory health insurance
reform was only temporary. Spending on ALG II will be
much higher than last year's outlay on unemployment
assistance, social assistance (for those who are fit to
work), and housing allowance. While spending per bene-
27  Under this regulation, unemployed persons aged 58 and over can
continue to draw unemployment benefit until the earliest possible
moment of entry into statutory retirement without having to be avail-
able for work.
28  On the one hand, the burden on the Länder was reduced by the fact
that the Land banks paid increased interest on assets that had been
transferred to them in the past. On the other, the federal government
was able to avoid paying transfers to the Postal Workers' Pension
Fund by selling claims on the fund (cf. table 20). However, it is still
uncertain whether the European Commission will accept these sales as
a legitimate deficit reduction given that this transaction really
amounts to a disguised loan (cf. box 8). 
Figure 15
Persons in Employment and Unemployed
Seasonally adjusted1
1 Figures: change in original figures compared to previous year in 000s.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; Federal Labor Office; Institutes' calculations;
from 3rd and 4th quarter 2005 onwards: Institutes' forecast.
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ficiary will decrease on average as a result of the fusion
of unemployment assistance and social assistance for
those who are fit for work, the number of beneficiaries
will actually be much higher than last year. There will
be little increase in pension payments because pensions
were not raised in the summer and the number of pen-
sioners is increasing only minimally. Furthermore, pen-
sioners have been paying higher social insurance contri-
butions since July 2005. Savings will also be made
because capital transfers such as the subsidy for owner-
occupied housing construction and investment grants
have been reduced. Public-sector investments are likely
to decline further. Finally, interest spending will
increase again in view of the high level of new borrow-
ing, given that interest savings will be lower than to
date in refinancing old debts.
Government spending is likely to increase next year
at a similarly moderate rate to this year. Personnel
spending will decrease as staff cuts continue, while the
large block of monetary social benefits will stagnate.
Pensions will not be raised, and pensioners will also be
compelled to pay a higher health insurance contribution
for an entire year. Labor market-related spending is
likely to fall slightly. Savings will likewise be made on
the subsidy for owner-occupied housing construction
and investment grants. Coal subsidies will be reim-
Figure 16
Employment Trend by Sector
1 Adjusted for seasonal fluctuations. — 2 Figures: change on preceding year in 000s.
Sources: Federal Labour Office; Institutes' calculations; from 3rd and 4th quarter 2005 onwards: Institutes' forecast.
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bursed because in previous years they were not adjusted
downward in accordance with the increase in world
market prices. However, the government will pay trans-
fers amounting to 3 billion euro to the Postal Workers'
Pension Fund. Social benefits in kind are likely to
expand at an above-average rate, while interest spend-
ing will also rise perceptibly. Following an ongoing
decline for many years in municipal investments, these
are now likely to increase because the local authorities'
financial situation has already improved substantially
as a result of higher income from business tax.
Tax revenue is likely to expand by 2.8% next year.
Revenue from income tax will increase only slightly in
view of the expected trend for wage and employment
growth. By contrast, revenue from profit-related taxes
will continue to grow dynamically. Turnover tax is
likely to rise at around the same rate as domestic
demand.
A slight increase in revenue from social insurance
contributions can be expected in 2006. Wages and the
number of insured employed will increase only slightly.
Contribution rates to pension and health insurance are
likely to remain constant. The income of the statutory
pension insurance funds will not suffice to finance
expenditure under the current law on benefit entitle-
Figure 17
Hours Worked1 and Domestic Employment2
1 Index, 1995 = 100; adjusted for seasonal fluctuations and working days. — 2 Index,
1995 = 100; adjusted for seasonal fluctuations.
Sources: German Bundesbank; Federal Labour Office; Institute for Employment
Research; Federal Statistical Office; Institutes' calculations; from 1st quarter 2005
onwards: Institutes' forecast.


















Selected Fiscal Policy Indicators,1 1991 to 2006
As % of nominal GDP

















1991 43.4 22.0 16.8 46.3 2.7 2.6 –2.9 12.2
1992 44.8 22.4 17.2 47.2 3.1 2.8 –2.5 14.1
1993 45.2 22.4 17.7 48.2 3.2 2.7 –3.0 14.3
1994 45.6 22.3 18.2 47.9 3.2 2.5 –2.3 14.2
19953 44.9 21.9 18.3 48.1 3.5 2.2 –3.0 15.9
1996 46.0 22.4 19.0 49.3 3.5 2.1 –3.3 15.5
1997 45.7 22.2 19.2 48.4 3.4 1.8 –2.6 15.3
1998 45.9 22.7 18.9 48.0 3.4 1.8 –2.2 14.8
1999 46.6 23.8 18.7 48.1 3.1 1.9 –1.5 13.2
20004 46.4 24.2 18.3 47.6 3.2 1.8 –1.2 13.0
2001 44.7 22.6 18.2 47.6 3.1 1.7 –2.8 13.5
2002 44.3 22.3 18.1 48.1 2.9 1.7 –3.7 13.2
2003 44.4 22.3 18.2 48.4 3.0 1.5 –4.0 13.4
2004 43.2 21.7 17.8 46.9 2.8 1.4 –3.7 13.1
20055 42.9 21.5 17.6 46.4 2.9 1.3 –3.5 13.3
20065 42.7 21.7 17.4 45.8 2.9 1.3 –3.1 13.3
1 On national accounting definitions. — 2 Government interest spending as % of tax revenue. — 3 Excluding asset transfers linked to the assumption of the debts of the Treu-
handanstalt (privatization agency) and the housing sector of the former GDR (–119.4 billion euro). — 4 Excluding receipts from the sale of UMTS licences (50.8 billion euro).
— 5 Taking account of 'reduced expenditure' resulting from the sale of asset-backed securities from the Postal Workers' Pension Fund (2005: 5.5 billion euro; 2006: 2.5 billion
euro).
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; Institutes' calculations; 2005 and 2006: Institutes' forecast.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005  407
ments and at the current contribution rates, but the need
for a hefty government transfer can be avoided by the
fact that at the beginning of next year social contribu-
tions will have to be paid two weeks earlier by enter-
prises than has been the case to date.29
Under the assumptions made here, the government
budget deficit will fall in 2006 to 70 billion euro or 3.1%
of nominal GDP. The deficit limit stipulated in the
Maastricht Treaty will therefore be exceeded for the
fifth time in a row.
Statistical calculation of deficit and 
debt ratios in the European fiscal 
surveillance procedure
There has recently been some ambiguity regarding the
size of the budget deficit and the level of indebtedness
as a share of nominal GDP. The doubts have three ori-
gins: differences in the definition of GDP at German and
European level, the way in which the sale of claims on
the Postal Workers' Pension Fund should be handled,
and the treatment of 'placeholder transactions'.
In 2005, the calculation of GDP was revised in Germany
in accordance with the new European standards. Since
then, banking services (FISIM) have been booked using
a different procedure that leads to a higher level of GDP
(cf. 'The World and the German Economy in the Spring
of 2005', in: DIW Berlin Weekly Report, no. 14/2005,
p. 161). Given that not all EU countries have yet imple-
mented this revision, the GDP used in the European pro-
cedure of fiscal surveillance for 2005 is still that defined
in accordance with the old convention. The deficit ratios
calculated on this basis are somewhat higher than those
based on the official National Accounts data.
There is still disagreement as to how the sale in 2005 of
asset-backed securities from the Postal Workers' Pen-
sion Fund (8 billion euro) should be booked in the
National Accounts. Both the federal government and the
Federal Statistical Office classify the pension fund as
belonging to the enterprise sector, while Eurostat sees it
as a public-sector entity and therefore interprets these
sales as government borrowing (cf. 'The World and the
German Economy in the Spring of 2005', in: DIW Berlin
Weekly Report, no. 14/2005, p. 172). If the calculation is
based on the Eurostat view, then the budget deficit will
be higher than that reported here by 5.5 billion euro or
0.2% of nominal GDP in 2005 and by 2.5 billion euro or
0.1% of nominal GDP in 2006.
Moreover, the Eurostat data also shows a higher level of
debt (1 451 as opposed to 1 437 billion euro at the end
of 2004) because Eurostat now interprets 'placeholder
transactions' as borrowing; the German Development
Bank (KfW) had acquired government shares, for exam-
ple in Deutsche Telekom, and had already paid divi-
dends to the government before the shares were sold.
Box 8
29  In 2006, therefore, as a one-off effect, the social insurance funds will
take in contributions on wages for 13 months (December 2005 to
December 2006). The result for employees will be a loss of interest
payments for around two weeks. The anticipation of the payment
deadline will have no effect on revenue from social insurance contribu-
tions under national accounting regulations, which allocate the contri-
butions according to the period for which they are paid.
Table 20
Effects of Discretionary Measures on Taxes, 
Social Security Contributions, and 
Government Spending1
Increase (+) and decrease (–) in the tax burden on households 
in billion euro compared with 2004
2005 2006
Reduction in income-tax rates 
(3rd phase of tax reform) –6.2 –6.3
Reduction of tax concessions2 3.9 6.3
Pension Income Act –1.0 –1.3
Increase in tobacco tax 0.5 0.5
Reform of business tax 0.3 0.4
Efforts to combat illicit employment 0.8 0.9
Increase in childless individuals' (aged 23-65) 
contribution to nursing-care insurance 0.7 0.7
Increase in pensioners' contribution to 
nursing-care insurance 0.4 0.4
Reduction of contribution to statutory health 
insurance by 0.05 percentage points in 2005 –0.5 –0.5
Increase in pensioners' contribution to statutory 
health insurance 0.3 0.6
Highway toll on goods vehicles 
(net of implementation costs) 2.4 2.6
Hartz IV labor market reform –5.0 –5.0
Subsidy reductions 0.2 1.0
Staff reductions in public service 1.5 3.0
'Future Education and Care' investment program –0.6 –1.0
Total –2.3 2.3
Memo item:
Capitalization of claims on Postal Workers' 
Pension Fund 5.5 2.5
Repayments by Land banks 2.2 –1.0
Asset transfers to Bankgesellschaft Berlin –1.1
Debt relief (e.g., Iraq) –1.4 –1.4
1 Not including savings in budget execution and not including 'hidden' tax
increases; not including repercussions at macroeconomic level. — 2 Especially
including measures under the Supplementary Budget Act 2004, implementation of
the government protocol declaration on the conciliation procedure regarding the
Tax Benefits Reduction Act, Tax Benefits Reduction Act 2003).
Sources: Federal Ministry of Finance; Institutes' calculations.408 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005
Economic Policy
At the start of its period in office the new Federal Gov-
ernment is facing a truly difficult situation in economic
policy. Some reforms have been launched in recent
years, but there are no signs of a breakthrough in solv-
ing the fundamental problems in the German economy.
These are evident particularly in that medium-term
growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) has been
declining continuously and unemployment has been ris-
ing for decades.30 It is the responsibility of economic pol-
icy to reverse these negative trends, and that will
require a clear analysis of the reasons for the poor level
of growth and the bad situation on the labour market.
This is the only way to evolve a concept that could
bring a lasting improvement in the outlook. The situa-
tion is so dramatic that the Federal Government cannot
afford to delay fundamental changes in economic policy
any longer.
The need for action is not lessened by the fact that
Germany has been hailed as 'world champion in
exports' (of goods). This does show that German firms
are very productive and that many economic sectors
have comparative advantages. But a country's prosper-
ity does not solely depend on exports. What counts is
how strongly real incomes, and so ultimately scope for
consumption, are growing in the long term. In that
regard the development in recent years has been as bad
as it could be, for in real terms private consumption has
hardly increased at all. For large sections of the popula-
tion that is equivalent to a fall in the standard of living.
That has not happened in almost any other major indus-
trial country in recent decades. And the prospects for
growth are rightly seen as poor. In the longer view, that
is, in 10 to 15 years, if action is not taken in economic
policy growth in per capita incomes will slow down fur-
ther, if only through the already foreseeable demo-
graphic development. If so, the problems for public
finance would also worsen, and the burden of charges
on individuals would rise even further. All this is
reflected in people's expectations, and it is presumably
already dampening consumer spending and private
investment. The weakness in growth can only be over-
come if the fundamental conditions are improved, so
that productivity rises faster, people work more and
more is invested than hitherto.
The pressure to act is being increased particularly
by the need to adjust caused by globalization. Interna-
tional competition has increased as more and more
states adopt market economy principles. And many
countries _ particularly our competitors within the Euro-
pean Union _ are endeavouring to lower their taxes fur-
ther. That is hitting the German economy particularly
hard, not least because international competition for
inward investment has increased in our neighboring
countries. Similarly, the wage level has come under
pressure from the supply of labour in the new EU mem-
ber states. We cannot evade all these tendencies in Ger-
many. If we do not face up to the competition and do not
make good use of the opportunities it also brings, Ger-
many will inevitably fall behind.
Against the background of these major challenges
the discussion between the parties during the Federal
election campaign over the right economic policy strat-
egy was not exactly helpful. One example is the contro-
versy over Kirchhof's proposal for fundamental reform
of the tax system. There has long been consensus, not
only among economists but in policy as well, that it
would be meaningful to simplify the tax system and
make it more neutral. And economists agree that a sys-
tem in which the assessment bases are widened, and the
rates of tax reduced, would be vastly superior to the
present system in regard to efficiency. That applies to
the proposal to introduce a flat rate of tax, as well as to
other concepts that have been on the table for a consid-
erable time. It is only of secondary importance whether
any particular proposal for specific rates of tax would
lead to more or less tax revenue. If the concepts to
improve the tax system presented by economists had
been taken up in policy this would have signalled a fun-
damental change in economic policy. The chance was
missed.
The new Federal Government faces the big task of
formulating an economic policy concept and tackling
reforms courageously. Otherwise it will not succeed in
easing the problems of low growth and high unemploy-
ment. It must not restrict itself to a number of individual
measures. In the present situation aspects of allocation
should be the main focus in order to improve the condi-
tions for growth and employment. Distribution policy
considerations should come second.
What is needed, as the Institutes have repeatedly
emphasized in earlier Reports, is a complete concept, in
which the individual measures are coordinated and not
mutually contradictory. The guiding principles of policy
must be recognizable, and they include the following
basic decisions:
1. Intervention by the state should be reduced in favour
of more market economy elements and more individ-
ual responsibility. That applies to the labour market
as well as to the systems of social security.
2. The state must concentrate on its basic tasks. Much
public expenditure is unproductive, but it has to be
financed with distorting taxation. That hampers
30  Cf. also the analysis in the 2005 Spring Report, in: DIW Berlin
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growth. Hence, this kind of expenditure should be
reduced. That would create more scope to increase
the particularly productive expenditure by the state
on research and the infrastructure _ areas that have
been neglected in recent years.
3. At the same time public finance must be consoli-
dated. That is not only to ensure that the public bud-
gets in Germany meet the requirements of the consti-
tution and that the Stability and Growth Pact is ful-
filled, it is chiefly to halt the rise in the debt ratio and
reverse that trend. The consolidation should be only
on the expenditure side, namely cuts in consumption
spending.
4. The burden of charges on households and companies
must not rise any further, it must be brought down
in the medium term. Reducing tax concessions must
be utilized to lower the rates of tax.
5. The incentives to work must be increased, as must
the incentives to create profitable jobs in the private
sector. That will require changes in tax and social
policy, and in the legal framework for the labour
market. The measures taken so far as part of the
Hartz reforms are not nearly enough. Some are actu-
ally counterproductive as far as incentives are con-
cerned, and they are also causing considerable addi-
tional state expenditure.
6. The other protagonists need to be reminded of their
responsibility in economic policy. The state is not
responsible for every objective, and it cannot achieve
them all alone. It can only _ and that is important
enough _ set a suitable framework. In the distribu-
tion of roles in economic policy the employers and
trade unions are essentially responsible for employ-
ment, especially through their wage rounds and the
regulations on working time.
The new Federal Government should acknowledge
those principles that are crucial to a genuine reform pol-
icy and will promote growth and employment. Whether
that will really happen is an open question. Pessimists
may expect reforms by the new Federal Government to
be reduced to the lowest common denominator, with a
clear concept being lost in the process. But an optimistic
view is also possible. In contrast to past years the major
parties could now launch joint initiatives and succeed in
establishing them, particularly as they are unlikely to be
blocked in the Upper House (the Bundesrat), since the
major parties also form the state governments. In some
areas the parties are largely in agreement, and some
concrete proposals have been put forward:
–   The proposal by Koch and Steinbrück to reduce sub-
sidies has been in circulation since 2003 and it
should be taken up again. The Institutes repeat their
recommendation to implement the measures that are
still outstanding and are not in dispute to the
amount of 70 billion euros within a period of five
years; in addition, tax concessions that were in dis-
pute at that time, like tax exemption for Sunday,
public holiday and night shift bonuses, should be
ended. That would create scope for lowering the
rates of tax and increasing public investment. The
need for this is recognized by the major parties.
–   There is on principle agreement on the objective of
consolidating public finance, but agreement still has
to be reached on exactly how this is to be done and
at what speed. The intentions the parties have so far
expressed on this are not very precise, and they are
far too tentative in regard to the medium term pros-
pects for public borrowing. Moreover, they are not in
accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact. A
consistent policy of savings on consumption expen-
diture and a rapid reduction in financial assistance
are needed to bring the budget deficit and the ratio
of public borrowing down markedly.
–   There is also agreement on principle on the need to
reform corporate taxation. The Council of Experts is
currently working on a comprehensive concept for
the Federal Government that will also include spe-
cific proposals for implementation. The Institutes
have already, in spring 2005, stated their preference
for a dual income tax. This could be introduced as
early as 2007. A measure that can be taken immedi-
ately is the decision by the Job Summit in spring this
year, and this should be implemented.
–   Agreement was reached some time ago on many
points of reform of the federalist system. But the
areas where more competition and so greater effi-
ciency could be achieved were excluded from the
negotiations. One example is redrafting the financial
constitution. Reform here should be tackled much
more courageously, to create stimulus to more
growth and employment.
If the new Federal Government concretizes these
points or develops them further, and then also imple-
ments them rapidly, the first big step would be taken.
But others who bear responsibility for economic policy
must also act. The discussion during the Federal elec-
tion campaign on lowering subsidiary wage costs only
touches part of the problem, for the diagnosis is: labour
costs in Germany are too high in many sectors. So this is
not primarily an area where the state must act, the
employers and the trade unions bear the main responsi-
bility. Certainly, collectively agreed wages have risen
only moderately in recent years and working time has
become more flexible, but these agreements were often
only reached when the difficulties had worsened. To
avoid matters coming to a crisis both sides in the wage
rounds should be more open to plant agreements and
allow greater flexibility in working time.410 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005
If the principles for economic policy outlined above
are implemented and the corresponding reform propos-
als put into effect quickly the economy need not move
into a phase of weak growth. People's expectations
could very quickly be changed into a more positive out-
look. For these reforms are chiefly designed to raise the
path of growth, and this will ultimately benefit every-
one. If, for example, the public budgets are consolidated,
as the Institutes propose, people need no longer fear that
charges will be increased in future; they may actually
expect them to fall. That will counter any possible con-
tractive effects of the budget consolidation. Moreover,
the macroeconomic environment is favorable in many
respects and it should encourage reform. The world
economy is expanding at a rapid rate, and this will also
support demand in Germany. In addition, interest rates
have been very low by German standards for a long
time. The monetary framework conditions have also
continuously improved, as the German currency has
been devalued year by year in real terms, while the real
interest rate has remained unchanged, or at least the gap
to other countries has not widened. Finally, the low level
of interest rates on the capital market also eases the bur-
den of interest payments on the state budget.
Fiscal policy
If the legislation is not changed Germany may be
expected to exceed the limit for the public deficit laid
down in the Maastricht Treaty for the fifth year in suc-
cession. A nearly balanced budget has moved into the
distant future. The gap in public finance is only partly
due to the low level of growth. By far the greater part is
structural; according to estimates by international orga-
nizations the deficit, adjusted for cyclical factors, is cur-
rently about 3%.31 So if the economic situation improves
the budget deficit will probably fall only slightly unless
additional consolidation measures are taken, and the
level of borrowing will rise. The budget deficits need to
be brought down significantly in the short term if Ger-
many is not to risk a resumption of the EU deficit pro-
ceedings. Moreover, there is a risk that the budgetary
scope for the state will be noticeably reduced in future if
interest rates rise. So far the low level of interest rates
has ensured that interest payments fell in relation to
nominal GDP, despite a rising level of debt. Now the
debt ratio is coming close to 70%, and interest rates may
not remain as low as hitherto in the medium term.32
Moreover, the automatic stabilizers can only have their
full effect if the deficit has been sufficiently reduced. 
There is need for action for other reasons, as well.
The tax burden on companies is still too high in Ger-
many compared with other countries. The factor labour
is still made very much more expensive by subsidiary
wage costs. There is considerable need for reform in
pensions, health and nursing care insurance, owing to
the foreseeable change in the age structure of the popu-
lation, if only to avoid a further rise in subsidiary wage
costs. The first steps have been taken in all these areas
in recent years, but they are not nearly enough to
achieve real improvement in the conditions for growth
and employment and achieve viable public financing.
It is important for the new Federal Government to
set the signals as quickly as possible and pursue a con-
sistent strategy, state its objectives and set clear priori-
ties. The measures on the expenditure side should be
preceded by comprehensive and critical assessment of
public tasks, with all public expenditure under the
microscope. The Federal Government should identify
potential for savings, but also indicate in which areas
expenditure needs to be increased to promote growth.
On balance state expenditure should be limited to enable
the budget deficits and the burden of charges to be
brought down. On the revenue side comprehensive
reform of the tax system should be tackled, with the
objective of creating simple and largely neutral tax leg-
islation and improving companies' tax competitiveness.
At the same time reform of the system of social insur-
ance must be advanced to make this viable, bring down
the burden of subsidiary wage costs and create more
jobs.
The plans presented so far to consolidate the bud-
gets are not very ambitious. The structural budget defi-
cit will hardly be reduced this year, nor is it certain that
it can be reduced in the medium term, either. Hence fis-
cal policy will actually fail to meet the requirements of
the reformed Stability and Growth Pact, which states
that countries with an excessive public deficit and a
debt level of more than 60% of their GDP must reduce
their deficit ratio, after cyclical adjustment, by at least
0.5 percentage points each year. If only to meet these
requirements policy must intensify its efforts to bring
the deficit down quickly below the 3% mark and come
close to a balanced budget by the end of this legislative
period.33
There is some controversy in the public discussion
on the possible cyclical effects of consolidating the pub-
lic budgets. On the one side, cutbacks in expenditure
31  The IMF estimates Germany's budget deficit after cyclical adjust-
ment as 3.2% for 2004 (World Economic Outlook, September 2005). In
its Economic Outlook of May 2005 the OECD puts it at 2.6% and the
European Commission, in its 2005 Spring Prognosis, at 3.3%. 
32  A rise in capital market rates of one percentage point would cost the
public budgets about 15 billion euros a year (0.7% of nominal GDP in
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and reducing tax concessions should in themselves have
a dampening effect in the short term. On the other hand,
demand will be stimulated if there is a prospect of con-
solidating public finances. A clearly falling debt ratio
can make consumers and companies more confident that
the burden of taxes and charges will fall in the medium
term. Moreover, the prospects for growth will be better
if subsidies and tax concessions are reduced, so remov-
ing allocation distortions. In the medium term view,
higher growth will also increase the revenue from taxa-
tion and social insurance contributions, and require
lower labour market expenditures, so enabling charges
to be reduced. Admittedly, empirical studies have
shown that the dampening effects will predominate in
the short term,34 but in the medium term a steeper
growth path is to be expected.35
It is important to ensure that consolidation is quali-
tative and will promote growth. On the one side that
means savings in state spending on consumption and
tax concessions. In particular, subsidies and asset trans-
fers (e.g. the home ownership grant) need to be reduced
and reserves of efficiency in the public administration,
and in the social insurance system, utilized. On the other
side, investment expenditure on the infrastructure, edu-
cation and research and development needs to be mark-
edly increased. A specific starting point for cuts in sub-
sidies and tax concessions is available in the list of sav-
ings compiled by Koch and Steinbrück, which formed
the basis for the decisions by the Mediation Committee
of the Federal Parliament and the Upper House in
December 2003. The Institutes recommend making
these cuts within five years; but other tax concessions
also need to be reduced. The exemption for Sunday,
public holiday and night shift bonuses, for example,
cannot be justified in the economic view. The agree-
ments between the Coalition parties to declare ending
tax exemption for these bonuses taboo right from the
start is counter-productive.
In reforming the tax system lowering the tax burden
on companies should have priority, in order to make
Germany more competitive as a location for inward
investment. The tax burden on the retained earnings of
incorporated firms in the form of corporation tax, trad-
ing tax and the solidarity premium is around 39% in
Germany. It is lower in every other EU country, now
that some states have reduced their rates, in some cases
considerably. Germany is in a slightly better position in
actual taxation, where the differences in the tax assess-
ment basis are taken into account, but at 36% this is
still higher than the average of the other European coun-
tries. In the new EU countries the tax on the earnings of
incorporated firms is on average as much as about 16
percentage points lower tha n  i n  G e r m a n y .  A s  m o s t
countries are endeavouring to reduce the tax burden on
companies Germany's position in the international loca-
tion competition will deteriorate further if fiscal policy
does not take action. To counter any deterioration in
Germany's position the first step should be to imple-
ment the reform of corporate taxation agreed at the Job
Summit as quickly as possible.36 In the medium term
view such a reform should at least be neutral for tax rev-
enue, as low tax rates create incentives to create profits
within Germany.
However, this should only be the start of a more far-
reaching reform of income and profits taxation that will
33  Like the other Institutes, DIW Berlin believes the most urgent task
for fiscal policy is to support, without loss of time, growth-oriented
reform processes on both the expenditure and the revenue side. We
differ from the majority view, however, in arguing that this should
also be done if it would delay the consolidation process in the short
term. Hence, the two sides of the budget should not be hampering each
other, for example, in that necessary reductions in charges are not
made because it is not possible at the same time to cut expenditure, or
meaningful expenditure is held back with reference to the lack of
short-term finance from tax revenue. In weak cyclical phases as well,
the principle must be maintained that public tasks, whose social rate
of return is higher than the cost of financing them, are performed _ not
least in the interests of future generations. As domestic demand is still
weak and J-curve effects are to be expected from comprehensive
reforms that could, on balance, put a strain on the public budgets and
the economic situation, fiscal policy should continue to support eco-
nomic activity. An economic policy that intensifies consolidation
efforts in the present situation could jeopardies medium and long-term
growth potentials. If necessary steps in reform are made dependent on
finance, that would at present be tantamount to blocking the reforms.
The deficit ratio should only be reduced in a powerful upswing _ but
then, strongly. The higher rate of growth would already be reducing
the deficit ratio, but the credibility of that policy should be under-
pinned by a medium-term consolidation strategy that is anchored in
legislation.
34  Cf. Leibfritz et al.: 'Finanzpolitik im Spannungsfeld des Europä-
ischen Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspaktes _ Zwischen gesamtwirt-
schaftlichen Erfordernissen und wirtschafts- und finanzpolitischem
Handlungsbedarf',  ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, Munich
2001; and Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirt-
schaftlichen Entwicklung (ed.): 'Staatsfinanzen konsolidieren _ Steuer-
system reformieren'. Jahresgutachten 2003/2004, Stuttgart 2003,
Item 821.
35  Cf. e.g. A. Alesina and R. Perotti: 'Fiscal Adjustments in OECD
Countries: Composition and Macroeconomic Effects', in: IMF Staff
Papers, vol. 44, no. 2, 1997, pp. 210-248; and L. Schuknecht and
V. Tanzi: 'Reforming Public Expenditure in Industrialised Countries _
Are there Trade-offs?' ECB Working Paper Series, no. 435, Frankfurt
a.M. 2005.
36  The draft law to improve the tax conditions for inward investment
rejected by the Upper House provided for the rate of corporation tax to
be reduced from 25% to 19%, and a higher amount of trading tax to
be offset against income tax payable. The reductions were to be
financed by limiting the deduction of losses on tax postponement mod-
els, only half of which was to be taxable _ for a period of three years
only _ if unpublished reserves were declared on property sales and by
raising the minimum taxable amount of income. In addition, additional
revenue was expected from the repatriation of profits hitherto taxed
abroad. The budget effects were estimated at _0.1 billion euros on bal-
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not only reduce the tax burden. For the present tax sys-
tem causes distortions in investment and financing deci-
sions and in the choice of legal form for an enterprise, so
it is not neutral on decision-making. Moreover, the Ger-
man tax system is regarded as complicated and lacking
in transparency, with its many tax concessions and
exemptions, and it involves heavy costs to follow up
non-payments and for administration. Hence the assess-
ment bases should be widened by ending tax conces-
sions and exemptions and the rates of tax should be low-
ered.
A number of proposals have been put forward on the
details of such reform. Chief among them are the model
from the Social Market Economy Foundation, the pro-
posal for a 'simple tax system' from the Heidelberg Tax
Group, the Karlsruhe draft from Paul Kirchhof and the
draft favoured by the Council of Experts for a dual
income tax. All these proposals would constitute a con-
siderable improvement over the present system. In their
2005 Spring Report the Institutes favoured the dual
income tax. If it were introduced the differences in the
taxation of income from employment and income from
capital assets would enable the burden to be reduced
first where it is most urgently needed: on internationally
mobile income from capital. That would limit the tax
revenue shortfall. At the start of next year the Council of
Experts and the Social Market Economy Foundation
will published the details of their proposals. Then it is
up to the politicians to take them up and launch a tax
reform that can come into force at the start of 2007.
In social charges the Federal Government has not
achieved its aim of bringing the load down below 40%
of gross earnings from employment. It is now just under
42%, although various measures have been taken to
bring it down. From 1998 the grants to pensions insur-
ance have been greatly increased as part of eco tax
reform, in 2003 a grant to health insurance was intro-
duced, financed from tax revenue, and savings were
made by reforming pensions and health insurance. The
burden of charges was also increased in some cases, e.g.
by raising the assessment threshold for contributions to
health insurance in 2003. The level of contributions is
still high; it is a burden on the factor labour and an
obstacle to employment.
A rise in the contribution rate to pensions insurance
will only be prevented next year by bringing forward
the date when social insurance contributions as a whole
are due. Shifts of this kind will not solve the structural
problems. On the contrary, the statutory retirement age
needs to be raised in stages, the deductions for early
retirement increased, and the pensions formula modi-
fied. The Federal Government has incorporated a sus-
tainability factor in the pensions formula to enable
increases in pensions to be reduced if the relation
between the number in employment and the number of
pensioners should deteriorate. But a clause to maintain
the level of pensions will prevent these from falling this
year and next year. To ensure that the burden on pen-
sions insurance is reduced to the full extent needed the
cuts which this clause prevents should be made in good
cyclical years. It would also be appropriate to extend the
sustainability factor to officials' pensions as well.37
In health insurance the reform that came into force
in 2004 was essentially only a single reduction in the
level of expenditure. Not enough was done to increase
competition between hospitals and between the provid-
ers of health services. But that is necessary to achieve
lasting gains in efficiency and enable the rise in costs in
the health service to be kept down. And uncoupling
health insurance contributions from the development in
wages would also be helpful, if only because otherwise
the contribution rates, and with them subsidiary wage
costs, will rise further, for demographic reasons.
To lower subsidiary wage costs the CDU/CSU pro-
posed during the election campaign raising the standard
turnover tax rate by two percentage points and at the
same time lowering contribution rates to unemployment
insurance by two percentage points. This rearrange-
ment of the sources of state revenue would be largely
neutral on tax revenue,38 but the parties hope that as
wage costs fall growth would be strengthened and
become more employment-intensive. Persons in employ-
ment and companies would pay less social insurance,
but at the same time the higher rate of VAT would be a
heavier burden. If companies succeeded in passing on
the higher tax consumers' purchasing power would
shrink. If they did not succeed in doing so, which would
probably be the case in the present lackluster climate,
the tax increase would be at the expense of profits; com-
panies react to this by rationalizing, which is at the
expense of employment, or they try to push through
wage cuts. But the competitiveness of German suppliers
against foreign competitors would improve, and this
would have a positive effect, so that exports, that are not
subject to VAT, would tend to increase and imports
tend to fall. All in all, the Institutes regard the employ-
ment effects of such a shift in financing as slight.
37  A draft law presented by the Federal Government provided for this,
but it was rejected by the Upper House, as it did not contain any trans-
fer of measures with the same effect in statutory pensions insurance to
the officials' pension system.
38  Raising the standard rate of VAT to 18% would, on the present tax
basis, yield 15.5 billion euros for the public budgets. A reduction of the
contribution rate to unemployment insurance by two percentage
points to 4.5% would, with the present wage bill for persons in
employment paying social insurance contributions, reduce revenue by
14.5 billion euros (each estimated for 2006).DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005  413
A reduction of the contribution rate to unemploy-
ment insurance in 2006 would be possible, in the view of
the Institutes, without an increase in VAT. Expenditure
by the Federal Employment Agency has already been
reduced greatly this year, and with the expected devel-
opment on the labour market it should fall further next
year; moreover, the Federal Employment Agency will
also benefit from bringing forward the date when social
insurance contributions are due. Expenditure should
also fall from 2007 because from February the period for
which unemployment benefit is payable to persons
newly registering as unemployed will be shorter. The
Federal Agency itself has mentioned a reduction by 0.5
percentage points in mid-2006. The coming evaluation
of the labour market policy instruments should show
further possibilities for using the funds efficiently and
lowering contribution rates even further. The Institutes
want to see the contribution rate lowered by one per-
centage point in January 2006.
Wage policy
The wage trend has been very moderate since the start
of last year. In 2004 and in the first half of this year col-
lectively agreed hourly wages in the economy as a
whole rose by 1.2%. Labour costs (salaries and wages
per hour worked) actually remained almost unchanged
in 2004. That must be the lowest rise in wage costs since
1950. But as in a period with an especially large number
of working days, like 2004, the number of working
hours remunerated is smaller than the number of hours
worked, the basic tendency in labour costs is under-
stated. After adjustment for seasonal factors and work-
ing days and for temporary irregular effects, the
'smooth' component enables a better assessment to be
made of the trend in wages and wage costs.39
The growth in wage costs so measured (remunera-
tion to employees), earnings (gross wages and salaries)
and collectively agreed wages, all per hour, has fallen
markedly in the last one and a half years (upper section
of figure 18). In the first half of 2005 wage costs were
about 0.5% higher than a year before, earnings about
0.6% and collectively agreed wages about 1.1%. For all
three variables these are the lowest figures since 1991.
The wage drift adjusted for working days effects
and irregularities, that is, the difference between the
growth rate in the smooth component of wage costs or earnings, and the growth rate in collectively agreed
wages, has been negative since mid-2001 for both crite-
ria. At present it is about _0.5% for earnings (middle
section of figure 18). This is due to the reduction in wage
components above the collectively agreed rate, the
increase in weekly working time without a correspond-
ing increase in pay, or with only part compensation, and
39  To calculate the 'smooth' component of the time flows an unob-
served components model was estimated for the period 1991 to the 2nd
quarter of 2005. As components the trend (modelled as an integrated
random walk), the cycle, the season and a working days effect were
used. The smooth component is the sum of the trend and the cycle
components.
Figure 18
Key Data on the Wage Trend
1 Wage costs deflated by the GDP price index.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; German Bundesbank; Institutes' calculations.
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the ending of some overtime bonuses owing to plant
agreements on flexible working time.
The rise in real wages (wage costs deflated by the
GDP price index) has clearly flattened, and in part the
trend was actually negative (lower section of figure 18).
The "producers' real wage" was 0.1% lower than a year
before in the first half of this year. And the trend in
wages is currently very moderate relative to the prices
of other production factors. While, for example, up to
2002 wage costs per hour were rising by two to four per-
centage points faster than the prices of capital invest-
ment, in the quarters since then they have changed by
about the same amount.
In regard for employment these developments must
be seen as positive. Low wage rises improve the compet-
itiveness of the German economy, they make it less prof-
itable to buy pre-products abroad and they also tend to
create a more labour-intensive production structure and
so more employment. But it takes time for these positive
effects to materialize. Other factors, like the high density
of regulations on the labour market, or negative incen-
tives from labour market or social policy, are still hav-
ing a dampening effect. And Germany is still near the
top of the world table for wage levels, which cannot be
justified by a high level of productivity. The big fall in
employment in recent years compared with many other
countries has produced a 'job-cut productivity' that only
seemingly indicates scope for distribution.
If a moderate wage policy is to be successful compa-
nies must be sure that it will be continued during an
upswing as well, and have confidence in indications that
the trade unions will not attempt to make good any dis-
tribution losses they feel they have suffered with high
wage demands at the first opportunity. In earlier
Reports the Institutes have proposed that for wage
negotiations the trend growth rate in labour productiv-
ity should be reduced slightly, and only that part of the
inflation rate be taken into account that is not due to an
increase in administered prices or a deterioration in the
terms of trade.
As the trend growth rate in labour productivity is
about 1%, and the trend inflation rate as defined above
may be assumed to be slightly below that figure, collec-
tively agreed wages should rise by only about 1%, even
if the economic situation continues to improve and the
situation on the labour market becomes slightly more
relaxed. That is the only way for the market forces to
regain more scope to determine the level of wages and
the wage structure, and to ensure that the necessary
structural change is at least not hampered on this side.
Technical progress and global is at ion of the goods and
factor markets not only require adjustment of the aver-
age wage level, they also require greater wage differenti-
ation according to sectors, regions and occupational
qualifications. Collective wage policy must take more
account of this than hitherto, for instance with suitable
opening clauses in collective agreements. But economic
policy bears responsibility as well. Alliances for labour
on plant level must be given a legal basis, and the princi-
ple of the advantageous solution must be anchored in
legislation so that deviations from the collective wage
agreements are possible without legal problems.
In general, wage and labour market policy should
concentrate less than hitherto on securing existing jobs
and focus more on the creation of new jobs. Jobs will
inevitably be lost in the course of structural change. It is
therefore important to increase flexibility on the labour
market. Many studies have shown that a high degree of
protection against dismissal, for example, reduces that
flexibility and so, most importantly, increases the ratio
of long-term unemployed while reducing the reallocation
of labour, the number of new businesses being founded
and the employment-intensity of production. By interna-
tional comparison, and despite some relaxation in recent
years, Germany still has a relatively rigid system of pro-
tection against dismissal from regular employment, and
this needs reform. Similar considerations also apply to
other forms of intervention in the labour market. Eco-
nomic policy should advance in this area with more cou-
rageous steps in reform.
Monetary policy
The European Central Bank has repeatedly failed to
meet its target of keeping the inflation rate just below
2% in recent years, but the deviations were slight. In the
course of this year the rise in consumer prices has accel-
erated markedly; and the expansion of the money stock
and lending has increased noticeably. Against that
background the question arises whether the level of key
interest rates in the euro zone, which has remained
unchanged since June 2003, is still appropriate.
The main cause of the latest acceleration in inflation
is the further and extraordinarily strong increase in the
world market price for crude oil. Without the energy
component the rise in consumer prices in the euro zone
was slowing down until August; in September the core
inflation rate went up slightly to 1.5%; a year before it
was still 2.0%. So the basic price trend is still moderate.
For some time international competition has damp-
ened prices. The noticeable increase in worldwide inte-
gration is influencing the price level in the euro zone
through various channels. Firstly, the rise is being lim-
ited by falling prices, for imported finished products, for
example. Secondly, fiercer competition from imports and
the greater possibilities for shifting labour-intensive pro-
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directly depressing the rise in wages in the euro zone, so
there is no real pressure from that side to raise prices.
However, prices can start to rise more rapidly if the
high level of liquidity now available worldwide has an
increasing effect in stimulating demand. That would
also affect the inflation rate in the euro zone. At present
such acceleration of the inflation rate is not, apparently,
expected. Capital market interest rates, which are very
low worldwide, are an indication of this. But they may
possibly be a reflection of the high level of liquidity in
the world, and they are also an indication of a high sav-
ings ratio worldwide.40
But apart from the influences that may come from
abroad there are risks to price stability in the euro zone
because liquidity here has also risen markedly. That
process was combined with falling capital market rates,
a surge in share prices and in some countries strong
increases in property prices. This has not yet brought an
increase in inflation; demand in the economy as a whole
has increased only moderately, but the question is how
long such a situation can last without fuelling inflation.
The long phase of low key interest rates means that
more and more liquidity has been made available to the
banking sector, a process that is still continuing. The
banks have lent more to the non-bank sector, but they
have also purchased claims on the private sector (e.g.
corporate bonds). In both these cases long-term interest
rates are falling. However, this decline in interest rates
need not, in itself, lead to high demand for goods. In the
euro zone investment demand has been sluggish in
recent years, despite the low level of interest rates, and
chiefly because companies had accumulated debt during
the New Economy bubble that proved untenable in the
ensuing downswing. Accordingly, demand for new
loans was hesitant. On the other hand, housing con-
struction loans increased markedly, not least because
bank loans were available at more favorable rates owing
to the high ratio of security on real estate purchases.
However, it might have been expected that the
strong growth in liquidity would slow down noticeably
once the uncertainties had ebbed again. But there is as
yet no sign of that. Most recently, the increase in the
money stock has actually clearly accelerated, and the
liquidity overhang has increased considerably. Even if
this does not fully affect demand, because it is overshad-
owed by changes in investors' behavior, it does increase
the likelihood of a stronger cyclical recovery in the
medium term, with a consequent rise in inflation. The
main task for the ECB is to prevent inflationary expecta-
tions from growing.
The concern is not to embark on a restrictive course
in monetary policy now but only gradually to reduce the
expansionary course pursued so far. For the ECB, like
other central banks, reduced its key rate in 2003 to an
extraordinarily low level, owing to special circum-
stances. Volatility on the financial markets had
increased, partly against the background of terrorist
attacks, and there appeared to be a risk of deflation.
Those special circumstances are no longer given, and
interest rates as low as this no longer seem justified. A
further indication is that short-term interest rates are
currently below the neutral level. The neutral level of
interest rates is not easy to determine, but many esti-
mates suggest that it is about 3.5%.41 The actual inter-
est rate cannot remain below that level permanently, for
that would fuel the rise in liquidity in the euro zone. The
M3 money stock is still an important indicator of the
future inflation rate, and it accordingly plays a central
role in the ECB's monetary policy strategy. It has
already accelerated. That applies even more to M1,
where the transaction motive plays a bigger part. Hence
the risks to price stability have increased. It would be
difficult to avoid this if the ECB did not react, particu-
larly if the economic upswing in the euro zone firms. In
fact, there would be a greater risk of inflationary expec-
tations, and these are not yet strong enough to indicate
failure to meet the target. To prevent this the ECB will
tighten its expansionary course in monetary policy
somewhat in the course of the coming year. The Insti-
tutes regard it as appropriate for the ECB to raise its key
rates by a total of 50 base points.42
40  Cf. the remarks in the section of this report on the world economy.
41  It is assumed that the production potential in the euro zone is grow-
ing by 1.75% and the inflation target is just under 2%.
42  DIW Berlin does not at present see sufficient justification for the
ECB to abandon its present monetary course. Instead, important indi-
cators suggest that the monetary stability target is not jeopardized.
The core inflation rate, which is an indicator of homemade inflation in
the euro zone, is still falling. Nor are there at present any signs of sec-
ond-round effects that could come from the rise in prices due to the
surge in oil prices. Moreover the inflationary expectations that can be
read off from indexed bonds, suggest that the markets are not expect-
ing a significant rise in inflation in the longer term, either. The influ-
ence of international competition in goods and for locations in
disciplining the sources of profit- and wage-induced inflation in the
euro zone is also acknowledged by the other Institutes, but the inter-
pretation of the Euro money stock, which has risen markedly most
recently, differs. DIW Berlin sees this as not so much a 'liquidity over-
hang' that could entail a risk of inflation in the medium term as a side
effect of the growing integration and greater depth of the European
financial market, which also brings a permanently higher need for
liquidity for market participants. That is firstly the direct result of the
higher volume of transactions in financial products, and secondly,
market segments that are important and are becoming more important
(especially forward transactions) mean the maintenance of permanent
liquidity stocks to hedge risks. The difficulty of identifying empiri-
cally a demand for money based only on traditional trade in goods, the
volume of transactions, short-term interest rates and volatility criteria
is an indication of a fundamental change in the need for liquidity in the
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Appendix 1
Federal Republic of Germany: Key National Accounts Data – Forecast for 2005 and 2006
2004 2005 2006
2005 2006
1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half
1. Components of GDP
Change (%) on the previous year
Employed labour force (domestic) 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.6
Working hours per working day –1.1 0.1 0.1 –0.4 0.6 –0.5 0.7
Working days 1.5 –0.7 –0.7 –0.1 –1.2 0.0 –1.3
Labour volume by calendar month 0.8 –0.4 0.0 –0.4 –0.3 0.1 –0.1
Productivity1 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.2
Gross domestic product at 1995 prices 1.6 0.8 1.2 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.1
2. GDP by type of expenditure at current prices
a) Euro billion
Consumption 1 725.3 1 739.2 1 763.2 846.6 892.6 859.8 903.4
Private households2 1 312.5 1 325.8 1 346.0 647.7 678.1 657.9 688.2
Government 412.8 413.4 417.1 198.9 214.5 201.9 215.3
Fixed capital formation 384.9 381.6 386.6 181.2 200.4 183.9 202.6
Machinery and equipment 149.4 154.3 160.9 72.5 81.8 75.6 85.3
Construction 210.7 202.2 199.8 96.5 105.7 95.8 104.0
Other 24.9 25.2 25.9 12.2 13.0 12.5 13.4
Change in stocks3 –4.0 5.7 12.0 7.7 –2.0 10.0 2.0
Domestic demand 2 106.2 2 126.6 2 161.7 1 035.6 1 091.0 1 053.7 1 108.1
External surplus or deficit 109.5 117.7 127.1 64.7 53.0 68.3 58.8
Exports 842.8 898.3 965.7 437.2 461.0 474.7 491.0
Imports 733.4 780.5 838.6 372.5 408.0 406.4 432.2
Gross domestic product 2 215.7 2 244.3 2 288.8 1 100.3 1 144.0 1 121.9 1 166.9
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Consumption 1.3 0.8 1.4 0.8 0.8 1.5 1.2
Private households2 1.9 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.5
Government –0.6 0.2 0.9 0.2 0.1 1.5 0.4
Fixed capital formation 0.1 –0.9 1.3 –0.7 –1.0 1.5 1.1
Machinery and equipment 1.7 3.3 4.3 4.7 2.1 4.4 4.2
Construction –1.1 –4.0 –1.2 –4.6 –3.5 –0.8 –1.6
Other 1.6 1.3 2.8 1.4 1.1 2.6 3.0
Domestic demand 1.5 1.0 1.7 1.2 0.7 1.7 1.6
Exports 9.1 6.6 7.5 5.6 7.5 8.6 6.5
Imports 7.0 6.4 7.4 6.5 6.3 9.1 5.9
Gross domestic product 2.4 1.3 2.0 1.2 1.4 2.0 2.0
3. Real GDP by type of expenditure
a) Chain-linked volume data in Euro billion
Consumption 1 632.4 1 623.5 1 622.1 797.9 825.6 797.3 824.8
Private households2 1 238.6 1 232.9 1 230.8 605.6 627.3 603.1 627.8
Government 393.7 390.5 391.3 192.2 198.3 194.3 197.0
Fixed capital formation 396.6 392.9 398.5 186.0 206.9 189.0 209.5
Machinery and equipment 161.3 167.8 175.4 78.4 89.4 82.0 93.4
Construction 208.7 198.5 196.1 94.7 103.8 93.9 102.2
Other 27.1 27.6 28.7 13.3 14.3 13.8 14.9
Domestic demand 2 027.9 2 026.6 2 033.9 995.9 1 030.7 997.4 1 036.5
Exports 855.0 905.5 964.6 442.2 463.3 475.9 488.6
Imports 764.6 796.5 837.3 384.0 412.6 406.5 430.7
Gross domestic product 2 119.4 2 136.4 2 161.0 1 054.1 1 082.2 1 066.3 1 094.7
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Consumption 0.0 –0.5 –0.1 –0.3 –0.8 –0.1 –0.1
Private households2 0.6 –0.5 –0.2 –0.2 –0.8 –0.4 0.1
Government –1.6 –0.8 0.2 –0.9 –0.8 1.1 –0.7
Fixed capital formation –0.2 –0.9 1.4 –1.0 –0.9 1.6 1.3
Machinery and equipment 2.6 4.1 4.5 5.7 2.7 4.5 4.5
Construction –2.3 –4.9 –1.2 –5.9 –3.9 –0.8 –1.6
Other 1.8 2.1 4.0 2.2 2.0 3.6 4.3
Domestic demand 0.5 –0.1 0.4 0.3 –0.4 0.1 0.6
Exports 9.3 5.9 6.5 4.8 7.0 7.6 5.5
Imports 7.0 4.2 5.1 4.5 3.8 5.9 4.4
Gross domestic product 1.6 0.8 1.2 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.1DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005  417
Appendix 1 (contd)
Federal Republic of Germany: Key National Accounts Data – Forecast for 2005 and 2006
2004 2005 2006
2005 2006
1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half
4. GDP by type of expenditure: price level of national expenditure (2000=100)
Change (%) on the previous year
Private consumption2 1 . 41 . 51 . 71 . 21 . 82 . 01 . 4
Government consumption 0.9 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.4 1.1
Fixed capital formation 0.3 0.1 –0.1 0.3 –0.1 –0.1 –0.2
Machinery and equipment –1.0 –0.8 –0.2 –1.0 –0.6 –0.2 –0.3
Construction 1.3 0.9 0.0 1.4 0.4 0.1 0.0
E x p o r t s – 0 . 20 . 60 . 90 . 80 . 50 . 91 . 0
Imports 0.0 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.4 3.0 1.5
Gross domestic product 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.8
5. Factor incomes in GNP
a) Euro billion
Primary income of private households2 1 638.2 1 651.3 1 681.8 815.1 836.2 829.9 851.9
Employer social security contributions 222.5 219.6 220.2 107.4 112.2 106.5 113.7
Wages and salaries, gross 912.0 911.0 921.9 432.5 478.5 436.9 485.0
Other primary income4 503.7 520.7 539.6 275.3 245.5 286.5 253.2
Primary income of the other sectors 251.3 270.8 280.6 120.5 150.3 125.7 154.9
Net national income (primary income) 1 889.5 1 922.1 1 962.4 935.6 986.4 955.6 1 006.8
Depreciation 326.5 328.8 332.9 163.7 165.1 165.4 167.6
Gross national product 2 216.0 2 250.9 2 295.3 1 099.4 1 151.5 1 120.9 1 174.4
Memo item: national product at factor costs 1 658.3 1 689.4 1 720.7 821.9 867.6 836.2 884.5
Entrepreneurial and property income 523.8 558.9 578.6 282.0 276.9 292.8 285.8
Compensation of employees 1 134.5 1 130.6 1 142.1 539.9 590.7 543.4 598.7
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Primary income of private households2 1 . 30 . 81 . 81 . 30 . 31 . 81 . 9
Employer social security contributions –0.4 –1.3 0.3 –0.5 –2.1 –0.8 1.3
Wages and salaries, gross 0.5 –0.1 1.2 –0.2 0.0 1.0 1.4
Wages and salaries, gross per employee 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.7
Other primary income4 3 . 63 . 43 . 64 . 62 . 14 . 13 . 1
Primary income of the other sectors 20.6 7.8 3.6 4.3 10.6 4.3 3.1
Net national income (primary income) 3.5 1.7 2.1 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.1
Depreciation 1.6 0.7 1.3 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.5
Gross national product 3.2 1.6 2.0 1.5 1.6 2.0 2.0
Memo item: national product at factor costs 3.6 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.7 2.0
Entrepreneurial and property income 11.7 6.7 3.5 6.5 6.9 3.8 3.2
Compensation of employees 0.3 –0.3 1.0 –0.3 –0.4 0.7 1.4
6. Private households' incomes and expenditure2
a) Euro billion
Mass income 979.6 981.2 984.3 472.4 508.7 472.5 511.9
Wages and salaries, net 600.3 602.2 606.4 283.0 319.2 283.2 323.2
Monetary social benefits 457.7 459.7 460.4 230.2 229.5 230.8 229.7
Minus: charges on social benefits,
consumption-related taxes 78.4 80.8 82.5 40.8 40.0 41.5 41.0
Other primary income4 503.7 520.7 539.6 275.3 245.5 286.5 253.2
Other transfers received, net5 –35.9 –38.8 –40.0 –19.8 –19.0 –20.5 –19.5
Disposable income 1 447.4 1 463.1 1 484.0 727.9 735.2 738.4 745.6
Increase in claims 
on company pension schemes 19.0 20.2 21.5 9.4 10.8 10.0 11.5
Private consumption 1 312.5 1 325.8 1 346.0 647.7 678.1 657.9 688.2
Current savings 153.8 157.5 159.5 89.6 67.9 90.6 68.9
Savings ratio6 10.5 10.6 10.6 12.2 9.1 12.1 9.1418 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005
Appendix 1 (contd)
Federal Republic of Germany: Key National Accounts Data – Forecast for 2005 and 2006
2004 2005 2006
2005 2006
1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Mass income 1.4 0.2 0.3 –0.2 0.5 0.0 0.6
Wages and salaries, net 2.2 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.1 1.3
Monetary social benefits 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.9 0.3 0.0
Minus: charges on social benefits,
consumption-related taxes 2.9 3.0 2.2 3.0 2.9 1.8 2.5
Other primary income4 3.6 3.4 3.6 4.6 2.1 4.1 3.1
Disposable income 2.1 1.1 1.4 1.3 0.9 1.4 1.4
Private consumption 1.9 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.5
Current savings 4.0 2.4 1.2 3.7 0.6 1.1 1.5
7. Government revenue and expenditure7
a) Euro billion
Revenue
Taxes 481.2 483.4 496.9 238.8 244.7 245.8 251.1
Social contributions 395.3 395.0 398.7 192.7 202.3 194.1 204.6
Property income 12.0 12.2 12.4 5.8 6.4 6.6 5.8
Other current transfers 16.9 19.7 15.9 11.7 8.0 8.0 8.0
Property income, transferred 9.7 9.3 9.3 5.0 4.3 5.0 4.3
Sales 41.3 43.0 43.5 19.2 23.8 19.3 24.1
Other subsidies 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Total revenue 956.8 963.0 977.2 473.4 489.7 479.1 498.1
Expenditure
Inputs8 253.2 257.1 262.2 123.0 134.1 126.1 136.1
Compensation of employees 168.7 167.4 166.3 79.1 88.3 79.1 87.2
Interest payments 62.9 64.3 66.0 31.9 32.4 32.7 33.3
Subsidies 29.0 28.8 28.0 14.1 14.8 13.7 14.3
Monetary social benefits 422.9 424.4 424.5 212.6 211.8 212.9 211.6
Other current transfers 38.3 36.6 40.8 19.4 17.2 20.0 20.8
Capital transfers 33.8 34.4 31.0 20.3 14.2 18.3 12.7
Gross investment 30.8 29.8 30.3 12.7 17.1 12.8 17.5
Net increase in non-produced capital goods –1.4 –1.4 –1.4 –0.6 –0.8 –0.6 –0.8
Total expenditure 1 038.0 1 041.4 1 047.7 512.4 529.0 514.8 532.8
Deficit/surplus –81.2 –78.3 –70.5 –39.0 –39.3 –35.8 –34.7
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Revenue
Taxes –0.1 0.5 2.8 0.9 0.0 2.9 2.6
Social contributions 0.2 –0.1 0.9 –0.1 –0.1 0.7 1.1
Property income –30.1 1.5 1.6 –0.9 3.7 13.7 –9.4
Other current transfers 7.8 16.6 –19.1 56.8 –15.2 –32.1 –0.3
Property income, transferred 5.8 –3.7 0.0 –3.1 –4.4 –0.2 0.2
Sales –0.9 4.0 1.2 –1.5 9.0 1.0 1.3
O t h e r  s u b s i d i e s –––––––
Total revenue –0.4 0.6 1.5 1.2 0.1 1.2 1.7
Expenditure
Inputs8 –1.2 1.5 2.0 0.8 2.2 2.5 1.6
Compensation of employees –0.2 –0.7 –0.7 –1.0 –0.5 0.0 –1.2
Interest payments –2.6 2.1 2.7 1.8 2.5 2.6 2.9
Subsidies –3.2 –0.5 –3.0 –0.8 –0.2 –2.8 –3.1
Monetary social benefits 0.5 0.4 0.0 –0.1 0.8 0.1 –0.1
Other current transfers –1.0 –4.3 11.5 5.8 –13.6 2.9 21.1
Capital transfers –6.0 1.7 –9.9 4.8 –2.5 –9.7 –10.0
Gross investment –6.5 –3.1 1.6 –6.6 –0.3 0.7 2.3
N e t  i n c r e a s e  i n  n o n - p r o d u c e d  c a p i t a l  g o o d s–––––––
Total expenditure –0.8 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.7
1 Real gross domestic product per hour worked. — 2 Incl. private non–profit organisations. — 3 Incl. net increase in value. — 4 Self-employed income/operating profits plus
property income received minus property income losses. — 5 Transfers received minus other transfers. — 6 Savings as % of disposable income (including the increase in
claims on company pension schemes). — 7 German government and social security funds. — 8 Incl. social benefits in kind and other production charges.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office (Series 18 of the National Accounts); Institutes' calculations; 2005 and 2006: Institutes' prognosis.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 34/2005  419
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